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INTRODUCTION 
On February 23, 2001, Abraham Abdallah, a busboy from 
Brooklyn, New York, was arrested for using the Internet at public 
libraries to steal the identities of more than 200 of the wealthiest 
business moguls in the United States, including Steven Spielberg, 
Oprah Winfrey and Ted Turner.1  After acquiring the celebrities’ 
social security numbers, credit reports, account numbers and 
addresses, Abdallah accessed their credit card and investment 
accounts and made an estimated $100 million worth of purchases on 
the Internet.2  In April 2001, a California court sentenced a man to 
200 years to life in prison for using the identity of Tiger Woods to buy 
$17,000 worth of goods, including a television and a luxury car.3  On 
June 5, 2001, after a request from the Governor, the Florida Supreme 
Court issued an order to impanel a grand jury to investigate the 
growing problem of identity theft.4  Currently, numerous legislative 
bills addressing the privacy of personal data are pending in the U.S. 
Congress.5  Significantly, the U.S. Supreme Court decided its first case 
involving identity theft in November 2001.6 
These legislative and judicial responses reflect the growing national 
concern over privacy of personal information and identity theft.7  
                                                          
 1. See Murray Weiss, How NYPD Cracked the Ultimate Cyberfraud-B’klyn Busboy 
Busted in Theft of 200+ Tycoon IDs, N.Y. POST, Mar. 20, 2001, at 4 (reporting that 
Abdallah used the Internet, cellular phones, and voice mailboxes to steal identities of 
the wealthiest Americans listed in Forbes 400). 
 2. See id. (explaining that Abdallah’s cybercrime has been considered one of the 
largest identity theft cases in Internet history); see also Protecting Privacy and Preventing 
Misuse of Social Security Numbers:  Hearing Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 
Subcomm. on Soc. Sec., 107th Cong. 60 (2001) [hereinafter Ways and Means Hearings] 
(statement of Michael Fabozzi, Detective, New York City Police Department) 
(recounting Abdallah’s strategy for stealing identities). 
 3. See Someone Else Loses to Tiger Woods, CARDFAX, Apr. 30, 2001 (explaining that 
Anthony Lemar Taylor, who had been convicted of 20 misdemeanors, was sentenced 
under California’s three strikes law), available at 2001 WL 8724954, *1. 
 4. See Grand Jury Seated to Study Identity Theft, TAMPA TRIB., June 5, 2001, at 2 
(explaining that eighteen jurors will be selected to investigate identity theft). 
 5. See, e.g., Social Security Number Privacy and Identity Theft Prevention Act of 
2001, H.R. 2036, 107th Cong. (2001) (amending the Social Security Act to enhance 
privacy protections and to prevent fraudulent misuse of social security account 
numbers); Identity Theft Prevention Act of 2001, S. 1399, 107th Cong. (2001) 
(amending the Fair Credit Reporting Act to develop procedural guidelines for credit 
reporting agencies’ handling of discrepancies in a consumer’s account). 
 6. See TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001) (holding that a general 
discovery rule does not apply to toll the statute of limitations for suits under the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act); see also David G. Savage, Court Set for New Term and Novel Issues, 
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2001, at A37 (explaining that the Supreme Court will examine 
the issue of whether the statute of limitations begins when identity theft is committed 
or when it is discovered). 
 7. See 147 CONG. REC. E988 (daily ed. May 25, 2001) (statement of Hon. E. Clay 
Shaw, Jr. (Fla.)) (referring to a Wall Street Journal article in which respondents 
ranked privacy as their primary concern above war and environmental disasters). 
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Identity theft is defined as a crime where “an individual appropriates 
another’s name, address, social security number, or other identifying 
information to commit fraud.”8  Recently, the U.S. Attorney’s Office 
recognized identity theft as “the crime of the new millennium.”9  
Consumer interest groups have called identity theft “one of the 
nation’s fastest growing white-collar crimes.”10  Identity theft has 
become “a national crisis,”11 as personal information is becoming 
more accessible, and as the above cases illustrate, criminals are 
becoming more computer literate and technologically savvy.12 
Identity theft is unique because consumers do not know they have 
become victims of identity theft until an application for employment, 
a loan, or a mortgage is denied because an imposter has destroyed 
their credit reports or has established criminal records in their 
names.13  Approximately 500,000 to 700,000 people become victims of 
identity theft annually.14  The burden on victims of identity theft is 
significant as they face the arduous tasks of reestablishing their credit 
ratings and their reputations.15 
                                                          
 8. The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act: Hearing on S.J. Res. 512 Before the 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Tech., Terrorism, and Gov’t Info., 105th Cong. 
17 (1998) [hereinafter May 20, 1998 Hearings] (statement of David Medine, Associate 
Director Credit Practices, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”)) (presenting the FTC’s views on identity theft). 
 9. Sean B. Hoar, Identity Theft: The Crime of the New Millennium, U.S. ATT’YS’ USA 
BULL., Mar. 2001, 1, available at http://www.usdoj.gov:80/ 
criminal/cybercrime/usamarch2001_3.htm (last visited May 29, 2001). 
 10. Ways and Means Hearings, supra note 2, at 118 (statement of Edmund 
Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public Interest Research Group). 
 11. Id. at 16 (statement of Hon. James G. Huse, Jr., Inspector General, Social 
Security Administration); see also 147 CONG. REC. E989 (daily ed. May 25, 2001) 
(statement of Hon. E. Clay Shaw, Jr.) (reporting that allegations of fraudulent use of 
social security numbers increased nearly fifty percent between 1999-2000). 
 12. See May 20, 1998 Hearings, supra note 8, at 11 (statement of James Bauer, 
Deputy Assistant Director, U.S. Secret Service) (stating that the Internet has led to an 
increase in identity fraud); see also Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Identity Thieves Thrive in 
Information Age: Rise of Online Data Brokers Makes Criminal Impersonation Easier, WASH. 
POST, May 31, 2001, at A1 (reporting that identity thieves are now using personal 
information from commercial online data brokers, which collect and sell the data for 
a fee). 
 13. See May 20, 1998 Hearings, supra note 8, at 19 (statement of David Medine, 
Associate Director Credit Practices, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (stating 
that the harm resulting from identity theft “may not be readily apparent or easily 
quantifiable”). 
 14. 147 CONG. REC. S6129 (daily ed. June 12, 2001) (statement of Sen. Jim 
Bunning); see 147 CONG. REC. S4591 (daily ed. May 9, 2001) (statement of Sen. 
Dianne Feinstein) (stating that the FBI estimates that 350,000 cases of identity theft 
occur each year); O’Harrow, supra note 12, at A9 (citing that the Federal Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency estimated 500,000 victims of identity theft per year). 
 15. See May 20, 1998 Hearings, supra note 8, at 20 (statement of David Medine, 
Associate Director Credit Practices, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) 
(explaining the time-consuming process of clearing a fraudulent credit report). 
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This Comment will explore the relationship between the victims of 
identity theft and the credit reporting agencies.16  It will argue that 
both recent interpretation of the statutory language of the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (“FCRA”) and credit reporting agencies’ inefficient 
procedures make a victim’s recovery process almost impossible.17  Part 
I will describe the two main types of identity theft.  Part II will 
examine the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in TRW Inc. v. 
Andrews,18 which held that the statute of limitations for an action 
against a credit reporting agency begins at the time of the initial 
violation of the FCRA, rather than when the victim discovers the 
injury.19  Part III will address the statutory and procedural barriers 
that hinder rapid remediation for the identity theft victim.  It will 
further assert that the procedural inefficiencies created by the credit 
industry, as well as the statutory burden the Supreme Court 
condoned in its recent decision, only make a victim’s recovery 
process more difficult. 
Part IV will survey federal agency responses to the identity theft 
crisis.  Specifically, this Part will examine the mechanisms the Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”) has established to fulfill its obligations 
under the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act and the 
strides the FTC program has made in educating consumers, reducing 
the burdens on victims, and preventing identity theft.  Finally, Part V 
will address the voluntary initiatives and legislative proposals that 
could make a real impact on the identity theft victim’s recovery 
process.  In light of the spreading identity theft epidemic, it will 
conclude that Congress should look with increased vigor at the role 
of the credit reporting agencies in the identity theft crisis. 
I.   THE NATURE OF IDENTITY THEFT 
Identity theft affects victims in two principle realms—the financial 
realm and the criminal realm.20  The misappropriation of another’s 
                                                          
 16. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (2000) (defining a consumer reporting agency as a 
person who participates in “the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit 
information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing 
consumer reports to third parties”). 
 17. See Erika Morphy, New Privacy Laws, Please, But Not for E-Tailers, ECOMMERCE 
TIMES, Oct. 18, 2001 (explaining that the statute of limitations issue is only one 
barrier to consumers who want to maintain good credit, the other issue being the 
burden on the victim of identity theft to clear an erroneous credit report), available 
at http://www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/14244.html (last visited Aug. 1, 
2002). 
 18. 534 U.S. 19 (2001). 
 19. See id. at 28 (imposing a substantial burden on victims of identity theft and 
holding that the language of the FCRA precludes implication of a discovery rule). 
 20. See Identity Theft: How to Protect and Restore Your Good Name: Hearing Before the 
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personal information can ruin one’s financial history and can create 
a criminal record in the victim’s name.21  Whether an imposter 
obtains another’s personal identification information by “low tech”22 
methods, more sophisticated means,23 or even from the Internet,24 the 
effect on the victim’s credit and reputation can be devastating.25 
The most common misappropriation of another’s personal 
identifiers is financial identity theft, which can occur in many forms.26  
In an “account takeover,” the criminal accesses the victim’s existing 
credit card account to make unauthorized charges.27  The thief often 
                                                          
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Tech., Terrorism, and Gov’t Info., 106th Cong. 
32 (2000) [hereinafter July 12, 2000 Hearings] (statement of Beth Givens, Director, 
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse) (explaining that identity theft can be financial or 
criminal in nature). 
 21. Id.; see generally Brandon McKelvey, Comment, Financial Institutions’ Duty of 
Confidentiality to Keep Customer’s Personal Information Secure from the Threat of Identity 
Theft, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1077, 1082-88 (2001) (providing an overview of the 
various types of identity theft and its impact on consumers). 
 22. See Identity Theft: Is There Another You?:  Joint Hearing Before the House Comm. on 
Commerce, Subcomm. on Telecomm., Trade, and Consumer Prot. and Subcomm. on Fin. and 
Hazardous Materials, 106th Cong. 18 (1999) [hereinafter April 22, 1999 Hearings] 
(statement of Jodie Bernstein, Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) 
(discussing low tech methods of identity theft, such as rummaging through trash for 
bank statements or discarded credit card offers); see also July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra 
note 20, at 33 (statement of Beth Givens, Director, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse) 
(explaining that “the old fashioned way” of obtaining personal information is to steal 
a purse or wallet and either personally use the information or provide the contents 
to a crime ring). 
 23. See July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 33 (statement of Beth Givens, 
Director, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse) (describing a method called “the inside job” 
in which an employee who has access to client information steals their identities); see 
also April 22, 1999 Hearings, supra note 22, at 19 (statement of Jodie Bernstein, 
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (defining “skimming” as the act of 
copying information on a magnetic strip of an ATM or credit card and re-encoding it 
onto another card, transforming a blank card into one identical to that of the 
victim). 
 24. See ID Theft: When Bad Things Happen to your Good Name: Hearing Before the 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Tech., Terrorism, and Gov’t Info., 106th Cong. 
32 (2000) [hereinafter March 7, 2000 Hearings] (statement of Jodie Bernstein, 
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (stating that “[t]he Internet has 
dramatically altered the potential impact of identity theft”); see also id. at 23-24 
(statement of Gregory Regan, Special Agent in Charge, Financial Crimes Division, 
U.S. Secret Service) (explaining that the Internet increases identity theft because it 
creates a “faceless society” and “provides the anonymity that criminals desire”). 
 25. See, e.g., July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 24 (statement of Michelle 
Brown, victim) (describing the trauma she experienced with financial and criminal 
identity theft); see also 147 CONG. REC. E1030 (daily ed. June 6, 2001) (statement of 
Hon. Darlene Hooley) (explaining a case in which someone stole the identity of a 
child who died and was claiming him as a dependent on their income tax return). 
 26. See April 22, 1999 Hearings, supra note 22, at 18 (statement of Jodie Bernstein, 
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (stating that “[i]dentity theft almost 
always involves a financial services institution,” but may take on a variety of forms 
such as taking out loans, writing fraudulent checks, or opening a bank account in 
another’s name). 
 27. See id. (describing one of the many types of identity theft); see also U.S. GOV’T 
ACCT. OFFICE, No. GAO/GGD-98-100BR, IDENTITY FRAUD: INFORMATION ON 
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reports a change of address to the credit card company to avoid 
discovery by the victim.28  In “true person fraud,” the criminal 
assumes another’s complete identity and applies for new credit in the 
victim’s name.29  When credit card bills are not paid, the debt is 
reported on the victim’s credit report.30  The victim is usually not 
aware of the theft until, for example, a loan application is denied due 
to a poor credit history.31 
In March 2001, the FTC reported that opening new accounts and 
making unauthorized charges to existing accounts on credit cards or 
utilities were the most common identity theft cases.32  The FTC also 
reported that approximately fifty percent of victims experience 
multiple types of identity theft,33 including the criminal obtaining 
loans and mortgages, transferring money from bank accounts, and 
writing fraudulent checks using the victim’s identity.34 
                                                          
PREVALENCE, COST, AND INTERNET IMPACT IS LIMITED 18 (May 1998) [hereinafter GAO 
REPORT] (identifying three types of financial identity theft addressed in different 
sections of the U.S. Code). 
 28. See April 22, 1999 Hearings, supra note 22, at 18 (statement of Jodie Bernstein, 
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (describing the strategy used by the 
thief to execute an account takeover). 
 29. See GAO REPORT, supra note 27, at 18 (defining true person fraud and 
distinguishing it from other forms of fraud); see also July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 
20, at 34 (statement of Beth Givens, Director, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse) 
(explaining that identity thieves can also gain employment in the victim’s name). 
 30. See March 7, 2000 Hearings, supra note 24, at 32 (statement of Jodie Bernstein, 
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (explaining that consumers credit 
history is usually scarred). 
 31. See id. (stating that consumers may be denied mortgages, loans, new bank 
accounts, and even employment due to the identity thief’s activities). 
 32. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, IDENTITY THEFT COMPLAINT DATA: FIGURES 
AND TRENDS ON IDENTITY THEFT NOVEMBER 1999 THROUGH MARCH 2001 2 (2001) 
[hereinafter MARCH 2001 DATA] (stating forty-seven percent of victims who contacted 
the FTC reported credit card fraud and twenty-two percent reported fraudulent 
utility service). 
 33. See id. at 3 (reporting that half of the victims experience a combination of 
identity theft, whether it be both credit card fraud and bank fraud, or the creation of 
new utility accounts and personal loans). 
 34. See id. at 2 (showing that fifteen percent of victims reported that identity 
thieves wrote fraudulent checks, made unauthorized bank withdrawals, and 
established new bank accounts, and eight percent reported that thieves had obtained 
fraudulent loans); see also May 20, 1998 Hearings, supra note 8, at 19 (statement of 
David Medine, Associate Director Credit Practices, Bureau of Consumer Protection, 
FTC) (explaining that criminals usually seek out consumers with high incomes and 
good credit). 
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Criminal identity theft, termed “the worst case scenario,”35 affects 
approximately eleven percent of consumer victims.36  In criminal 
identity theft, the criminal gives the victim’s personal identifying 
information to a law enforcement officer upon arrest or issuance of a 
citation.37  When the imposter does not appear in court, a warrant for 
arrest will be issued in the victim’s name.38  The victim often will find 
out about the crime committed in his or her name only when he or 
she commits a traffic violation and a law enforcement officer runs a 
background check.39  A victim may also become aware of the identity 
theft when denied employment after the employer conducts a 
background investigation revealing the imposter’s criminal conduct.40 
II.  THE SUPREME COURT ADDRESSES IDENTITY THEFT 
The Supreme Court recently heard the story of Adelaide Andrews, 
a classic case of financial identity theft.41  The Supreme Court’s 9-0 
decision has highlighted one obstacle that a victim faces in 
recovering from identity theft.42  In Andrews’ case, the Court held 
                                                          
 35. July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 34 (statement of Beth Givens, 
Director, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse); see PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, FACT 
SHEET 17(G), CRIMINAL IDENTITY THEFT WHAT TO DO IF IT HAPPENS TO YOU 
[hereinafter FACT SHEET 17(G)](defining criminal identity theft and explaining what 
to do if you are a victim), at www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs17g-CrimIdTheft.htm (last 
visited Jan. 28, 2002). 
 36. See FTC, IDENTITY THEFT VICTIM ASSISTANCE WORKSHOP 16 (Oct. 23, 2000) 
[hereinafter IDENTITY THEFT WORKSHOP] (remarks of Joanna Crane, Attorney, 
Division of Planning and Information, FTC) (explaining prevalence of criminal 
identity theft). 
 37. See July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 24 (statement of Michelle Brown, 
victim) (recounting her experience when she received a prison sentence because an 
imposter gave her information to the DEA and a federal judge when the imposter 
was caught trafficking marijuana); see also FACT SHEET 17(G), supra note 35 (stating 
that criminal identity theft can happen through use of a counterfeit driver’s license 
containing another’s information). 
 38. See FACT SHEET 17(G), supra note 35 (outlining the techniques criminal 
identity thieves use); see also July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 34 (statement of 
Beth Givens, Director, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse) (citing a case in which a victim 
was returning to the United States from Mexico and was put in jail for ten days when 
a search revealed he was wanted for a crime, which in fact was perpetrated by an 
imposter). 
 39. See FACT SHEET 17(G), supra note 35 (explaining that the victim may be 
arrested and taken to jail because of an outstanding warrant in his or her name). 
 40. See id. (noting that an employer is legally obligated to inform the victim of 
the reason for rejection, which puts the victim on alert). 
 41. See TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 23 (2001) (reporting that Adelaide 
Andrews’ personal information was stolen by a receptionist at her radiologist’s office 
and was used to open various credit accounts). 
 42. See id. at 21 (stating that seven justices joined the majority opinion and two 
justices filed an opinion concurring in the judgment); see also Identity Theft: Special 
Report, CONSUMER REPS., Sept. 1997, at 10 (describing that suing credit reporting 
agencies for improper disclosures is a new avenue of recourse for identity theft 
victims). 
SHOUDT.PRINTER THIS ONE.DOC 12/4/2002  1:35 PM 
346 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:339 
that the statute of limitations for a suit against a credit reporting 
agency for improper disclosures begins at the time of the initial 
violation of the FCRA, not when the victim discovers that an 
improper disclosure occurred.43  As a result of this decision, victims 
will lose their opportunity to file a claim against a credit reporting 
agency for improper disclosures if they learn of the occurrence of a 
violation at any time after the two-year statute of limitations has 
expired.44 
A. Facts 
Adelaide Andrews’ ordeal with identity theft began at a doctor’s 
visit on June 17, 1993.45  At that visit, Andrews completed a Patient 
Information form, which included, among other standard 
information, her name, social security number, home address, 
driver’s license number, and date of birth.46  The receptionist, Andrea 
Andrews (the “Imposter”), copied Adelaide Andrews’ personal 
information and subsequently relocated to Las Vegas, Nevada.47  After 
moving to Las Vegas, the Imposter used Andrews’ personal 
information to rent an apartment and to establish telephone and 
electric service.48 
The Imposter then attempted to obtain services from five 
creditors,49 which subscribed to two different credit reporting 
agencies.50  On October 22, 1994, the Imposter applied for a credit 
account at Dillard’s department store, using her own name, her Las 
Vegas address, and Andrews’ social security number on the 
                                                          
 43. See TRW, 534 U.S. at 22-23 (holding that a discovery rule, in which the statute 
of limitations would begin to run at the time of the plaintiff’s discovery of the 
violation, does not apply to cases under the FCRA). 
 44. See Borrowers Beware, N.J. LAW.: WKLY. NEWSPAPER, Dec. 3, 2001, at 6 (reporting 
that a consumer, who does not request a credit report every two years, risks losing the 
opportunity to sue the credit reporting agency for damages from improper 
disclosures). 
 45. Andrews v. Trans Union Corp., 7 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1063 (C.D. Cal. 1998), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Andrews v. TRW, Inc., 225 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2000) 
rev’d 534 U.S. 19 (2001). 
 46. Id. 
 47. See id. (recounting the Imposter’s technique). 
 48. See id. (explaining how the Imposter used the name “Adelaide (Andrea) 
Andrews” on her apartment lease application and noting that credit reports were not 
requested for the Imposter’s apartment lease, telephone, and utility service 
applications). 
 49. See id. (indicating that the basis of Andrews’ suit against the credit reporting 
agency arises from these five attempts by the Imposter to secure lines of credit using 
Andrews’ personal information). 
 50. See id. at 1062 (explaining that when a consumer applies for credit, the credit 
grantor will obtain reports from a credit reporting agency to assess the customer’s 
credit and to determine whether the grantor should approve the application for 
credit). 
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application.51  Dillard’s obtained its credit reports from Trans Union 
Corporation, the defendant in Andrews’ original action.52  When the 
Imposter’s first initial, last name, and social security number matched 
those on the credit report file, Trans Union provided the credit 
report to Dillard’s.53  Dillard’s then approved the Imposter’s 
application for a line of credit and the account later became 
delinquent.54 
TRW Inc. (“TRW”),55  the credit reporting agency implicated in 
Andrews’ case in the Supreme Court, was the agency used by four 
other creditors to whom the Imposter applied for a line of credit.56  
On July 25, 1994, the Imposter used Andrews’ birth date and social 
security number on an application to First Consumers National Bank 
(“FCNB”).57  On September 27, 1994, the Imposter applied for a 
credit account from Prime Cable of Las Vegas, for which she used 
Andrews’ social security number.58  On October 28, 1994, the 
Imposter submitted an application to Express Department Stores, 
using her own identifying information but misappropriating 
Andrews’ social security number.59  Finally, in January 1995, the 
Imposter applied for credit from a retail lender, using her own 
identity but employing Andrews’ social security number and a 
misspelling of Andrews’ first name.60 
                                                          
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See id. (noting that the Trans Union database showed one file on Andrea 
Andrews, the Imposter, and two files on Adelaide Andrews, the plaintiff).  The 
Imposter’s file listed the Las Vegas address, but no social security number, and 
Andrews’ two files showed her Santa Monica address and a previous address in Texas.  
Id.  Although differences in the files existed, Trans Union provided all three reports 
to Dillard’s because the social security number, last name, and first initial matched.  
Id.  Trans Union, however, did include a “Trans Alert” warning to notify Dillard’s of 
the differing addresses.  Id. 
 54. See id. (citing one instance of harm caused by the Imposter). 
 55. See Experian, Ask Max (Apr. 23, 1997) (noting that TRW, Inc. had formerly 
been one of three national credit bureaus, but Experian Information Solutions, Inc. 
later assumed control over its business), available at http://www.experian.com/ 
corporate/max/max042397.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2002). 
 56. See Andrews v. Trans Union Corp., 7 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1063 (C.D. Cal. 1998) 
(stating that TRW, Inc. provided credit reports in the four other circumstances in 
which the Imposter attempted to obtain services and credit). 
 57. Id.; see Andrews v. TRW, Inc., 225 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2000) (providing 
details of the Imposter’s attempt to gain credit from FCNB, for which she used her 
own name, but Adelaide’s date of birth and social security number). 
 58. See Respondent’s Brief at 5, TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001) (No. 
00-1045) (reciting yet another attempt by the Imposter to use Andrews’ identity to 
open a new line of credit). 
 59. Andrews, 225 F.3d at 1065. 
 60. See id. (stating that the Imposter used her own information to apply for credit 
from Commercial Credit, except she used Andrews’ social security number and 
misspelled Adelaide Andrews’ first name as “Adeliade”). 
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TRW furnished Andrews’ credit reports to each creditor after the 
first initial, last name, and social security number on the credit 
applications matched the information contained in TRW’s credit 
reports.61  Of those applications, only the cable company accepted the 
Imposter’s request for a line of credit.62  Although the Imposter paid 
the cable company’s minimum payment for a number of months, 
eventually she let the account become delinquent.63  The cable 
account was sent to a collection agency, which pursued Andrews.64 
Andrews became aware of the identity theft on May 31, 1995, when 
she inquired about refinancing the mortgage on her home.65  The 
loan officer obtained a credit report that showed the fraudulent 
inquiries66 made on Andrews’ accounts at both TRW and Trans 
Union, including a notation that Andrews’ had defaulted on her 
credit account with Dillard’s department store.67  As a result of the 
delinquent account listing on her credit report, Andrews was denied 
the loan refinancing terms that she desired.68  Afterwards, Andrews 
experienced emotions common to identity theft victims: she was 
“shocked and humiliated by the allegation that she was neither 
creditworthy nor truthful about her financial dealings.”69 
                                                          
 61. See TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 24 (2001) (explaining that when the 
TRW computers registered a match, Andrews’ file was provided to the requester); see 
also Andrews, 225 F.3d at 1065 (declaring that TRW treated the Imposter’s credit 
inquiries as if made by Adelaide Andrews). 
 62. TRW, 534 U.S. at 24. 
 63. Respondent’s Brief at 5, TRW (No. 00-1045); see also Brief of Amici Curiae the 
Nat’l Assoc. of Consumer Advocates et al. at 9, TRW (No. 00-1045) (explaining that 
paying the minimum balance on fraudulent credit lines is one technique identity 
thieves use to avoid discovery). 
 64. Andrews, 225 F.3d at 1065. 
 65. See Andrews v. Trans Union Corp., 7 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1998) 
(explaining that Andrews discovered the identity theft when she spoke to a loan 
officer at Home Savings of America). 
 66.  See CALPIRG/PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, NOWHERE TO TURN: VICTIMS 
SPEAK OUT ON IDENTITY THEFT 12 (May 2000) [hereinafter NOWHERE TO TURN] 
(explaining that credit bureaus record every inquiry into a consumer’s account, even 
if the application for credit is ultimately denied), available at 
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/idtheft2000.htm (last visited July 21, 2002).  
Therefore, the imposter’s fraudulent applications for credit were listed on Andrews’ 
credit report.  
 67. See Andrews, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1064 (detailing the facts of Andrews’ loan 
inquiry in which  Home Savings of America obtained a credit report for Andrews that 
reflected the Imposter’s activities). 
 68. See id. (explaining that Andrews abandoned the loan application she filed at 
Home Savings of America and obtained financing from Merrill Lynch at a higher 
interest rate); see also Respondent’s Brief at 6, TRW (No. 00-1045) (discussing the fact 
that Home Savings of America denied Andrews’ loan application because of recent 
negative credit history). 
 69. Respondent’s Brief at 6, TRW (No. 00-1045). 
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Although TRW corrected her file,70 the violation of privacy71 still 
haunted Andrews for a year after it was discovered.72  The collection 
agency continued to pursue her, and she was denied credit once 
again due to the misinformation contained in the TRW credit 
report.73  Andrews also alleged that TRW’s breach of privacy led to 
emotional distress and exacerbated a pre-existing chronic medical 
condition.74 
B. The Lower Courts’ Analyses 
Andrews brought suit against TRW and Trans Union Corp. on 
October 21, 1996, alleging violations of the FCRA.75  The FCRA was 
enacted to balance the competing interests of the credit reporting 
industry and consumers.76  While providing credit is essential to the 
health of the economy, consumers are concerned with maintaining 
the accuracy and privacy of their credit histories.77  The FCRA 
reconciles these goals by requiring credit reporting agencies to adopt 
and maintain reasonable procedures to ensure accuracy and privacy.78  
                                                          
 70. See id. at 6-7 (implying that TRW’s attempts to clear Andrews’ credit file 
proved insufficient); Andrews, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1064 (explaining that Trans Union’s 
credit report continued to show the fraudulent Dillard’s inquiry and stating that 
Andrews filed an inadequate reinvestigation claim only against Trans Union, and not 
against TRW). 
 71. One of the purposes of the FCRA is “to insure that consumer reporting 
agencies exercise their grave responsibilities with fairness, impartiality and a respect 
for consumer’s right to privacy.”  15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(4).  When a consumer 
reporting agency discloses a consumer’s information in violation of a provision of the 
FCRA (i.e. disclosing information for an impermissible purpose), it is a violation of 
that consumer’s privacy.  
 72. See Respondent’s Brief at 7, TRW (No. 00-1045) (stating that Andrews was 
“vexed throughout the next year by resurgent problems springing from TRW’s and 
Trans Union Corporation’s lax consumer reporting procedures”). 
 73. See id. (describing how TRW “purported[ly]” took procedures to correct her 
files, but insisting that a collection agency continually “hounded” her and that 
Andrews was “confronted with resurgent misinformation”).  For example, the 
resurgent misinformation contained in Andrews’ TRW credit report complicated her 
application for credit when she changed residences.  Id. 
 74. See id. (explaining that Andrews experienced anger, frustration, worry, and 
mental anguish, such that her rheumatologist testified as to the exacerbation of 
Andrews’ chronic pre-existing medical condition). 
 75. Andrews, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1060-61.  In her complaint, Andrews alleged 
improper disclosure under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b and 1681e(a), inadequate procedures 
to maintain accuracy under 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b), improper reinvestigation by Trans 
Union in derogation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a), and violation of California’s Unfair 
Trade Practices Act.  Id.  See generally Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 
1681-1681u (2000) (outlining the obligations of credit reporting agencies). 
 76. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1)-(4) (outlining congressional findings that 
although credit reporting agencies are important to maintaining public confidence 
in the banking system, they also must respect consumer privacy). 
 77. See id. (stating that inaccuracies would undermine public confidence in the 
banking system). 
 78. See id. § 1681(b) (requiring credit reporting agencies to establish “reasonable 
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Towards this end, the FCRA authorizes disclosure of consumer 
reports only for certain limited and permissible purposes,79 requires 
parties to notify consumers if adverse action will be taken on the basis 
of their credit reports,80 provides consumers with the right to access 
information,81 and creates a procedure for disputing inaccuracies.82  
The FCRA also grants a private right of action to consumers but only 
for those seeking civil liability damages for willful, knowing, or 
negligent noncompliance with the FCRA’s provisions.83 
First, Andrews claimed that TRW and Trans Union violated 
§ 1681e(a) of the FCRA,84 which prohibits disclosure of consumer 
reports to third parties except for certain enumerated permissible 
purposes, such as credit transactions in which the consumer is 
involved.85  Andrews alleged that the agencies did not supply credit 
reports for a permissible purpose because there was no reasonable 
belief that she was the consumer “involved” in the transactions.86  
Second, Andrews claimed that the agencies violated § 1681e(b) of the 
FCRA,87 which requires credit reporting agencies to “follow 
                                                          
procedures” that promote and ensure accuracy, confidentiality, and proper 
utilization of the credit information received while at the same time remaining “fair 
and equitable” to the consumer); see also July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 73 
(statement of Stuart Pratt, Vice President of Government Relations, Associated 
Credit Bureau) (providing an overview of the purposes and uses of the FCRA). 
 79. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (enumerating the permissible purposes for which a 
credit report can be disclosed, including credit transactions involving the consumer, 
employment purposes, and underwriting of insurance). 
 80. See id. § 1681m (attempting to safeguard consumers by imposing certain 
duties on persons who utilize information contained in credit reports). 
 81. See id. § 1681g(a)(1) (setting forth requirements that every consumer 
reporting agency shall “clearly and accurately disclose to the consumer . . . [a]ll 
information in the consumer’s file at the time of the request”). 
 82. See id. § 1681i (detailing procedures to be taken in the event of a “disputed 
accuracy”). 
 83. See id. §§ 1681n-o (allowing a private right of action for noncompliance); see 
also id. § 1681h(e) (limiting liability of credit reporting agencies, among others, 
unless the allegation involves willful, knowing, or negligent noncompliance under 15 
U.S.C. § 1681n-o). 
 84. Andrews v. Trans Union Corp., 7 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 
 85. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(a) (providing that “[n]o consumer reporting agency 
may furnish a consumer report to any person if it has reasonable grounds for 
believing that the consumer report will not be used for a purpose listed in section 
1681b of this title.”).  Section 1681b authorizes certain limited conditions and 
circumstances under which a consumer’s credit report may be produced to a third 
party, including the allowance that a credit reporting agency may furnish a consumer 
report “to a person which it has reason to believe . . . intends to use the information 
in connection with a credit transaction involving the consumer on whom the 
information is to be furnished . . . .”  Id. § 1681b(a)(3)(A). 
 86. See Andrews, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1065 (alleging that Andrews’ file was not 
furnished for a permissible purpose because its disclosure was based on a credit 
application by the Imposter). 
 87. See id. at 1071 (claiming injury under 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b), which imposes a 
higher standard of accuracy on credit reporting agencies than is required by the 
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reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the 
information concerning the individual about whom the report 
relates.”88  Trans Union and TRW disclosed Andrews’ credit report to 
the five creditors when key identifiers, such as her first name, current 
address, and date of birth, did not match.89  She alleged that these 
disclosures facilitated her identity theft, and she sought injunctive 
relief, punitive damages and compensation for the time, money, 
inconvenience, and emotional distress that TRW had allegedly 
caused.90  
On the first claim of improper disclosures under § 1681e(a), the 
district court granted partial summary judgment for the credit 
reporting agencies, based on the statute of limitations.91  Section 
1681p of the FCRA allows an action against a credit reporting agency 
to be brought “within two years from the date on which the liability 
arises,” unless the defendant has made a material and willful 
misrepresentation of information.92  In that event, the two-year statute 
of limitations begins when the plaintiff discovers the 
misrepresentation.93 
TRW argued that because the first two disclosures to FCNB and 
Prime Cable were made more than two years before the suit was filed, 
those disclosures could not give rise to any liability.94  Andrews argued 
that the discovery rule95 should apply and that the statute of 
                                                          
improper disclosure rule under § 1681e(a)). 
 88. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). 
 89. See Andrews, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1063 (describing the Imposter’s various credit 
inquiries and highlighting the multiple occasions when the Imposter lacked, or 
failed to provide, accurate identifying information about the plaintiff, Adelaide 
Andrews). 
 90. See TRW, 534 U.S. at 25 (describing the injuries that Andrews alleged resulted 
from the law security at the credit reporting agencies). 
 91. See Andrews, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1067 (holding that the claim was barred by         
§ 1681p). 
 92. 15 U.S.C. § 1681p. 
An action to enforce any liability created under this title may be brought in 
any appropriate United States district court without regard to the amount in 
controversy, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, within two years 
from the date on which the liability arises, except that where a defendant has 
materially and willfully misrepresented any information required under this 
title to be disclosed to an individual and the information so misrepresented 
is material to the establishment of the defendant’s liability to that individual 
under this title, the action may be brought at any time within two years after 
discovery by the individual of the misrepresentation. 
Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Andrews, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1066. 
 95.  See generally 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 179 (2000) (defining the 
discovery rule as an equitable principle in which a plaintiff’s claim will not accrue 
until he or she discovers or should have discovered that they had a cause of action or 
until the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered all the elements of the cause 
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limitations did not begin until she knew or should have known of the 
improper disclosures.96  The district court stated that § 1681p clearly 
established a two-year statute of limitations,97 but examined whether § 
1681p could be read to include an implied discovery rule.98 
The district court concluded that the plain language of the statute 
precluded the application of the discovery rule.99  The court reasoned 
that the existence of the exception in § 1681p—applying the 
discovery rule when the defendant made a material and willful 
misrepresentation—implied that Congress did not intend for the 
discovery rule to apply to all FCRA cases.100  It explained that holding 
otherwise would depart from decisions in other circuits that have 
refused to toll the statute of limitations in FCRA cases until the 
discovery of the injury.101 Therefore, Andrews’ claim of improper 
disclosure of her credit report to the first two creditors (FCNB and 
Prime Cable) was time barred.102 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision 
that barred Andrews’ claims.103  The court recognized Ninth Circuit 
precedent that held that, as a general rule, “a federal statute of 
limitations begins to run when a party knows or has reason to know 
that she was injured.”104  Relying on Supreme Court precedent, the 
Ninth Circuit explained that “the equitable doctrine of discovery ‘is 
read into every federal statute of limitations’” unless Congress has 
expressly legislated otherwise.105  Finding no such expression from 
                                                          
of action).  
 96. Andrews, F. Supp. 2d at 1066.  
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See id. (relying on the premise that “[w]here ‘Congress explicitly enumerates 
certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be 
implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.’” (quoting Andrus 
v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980))). 
 101. See id. (stating that the Third, Seventh and Tenth Circuits all refused to apply 
a general discovery rule to § 1681p (citing Clark v. State Farm Fire & Cas., 54 F.3d 
669, 672-73 (10th Cir. 1995); Rylewicz v. Beaton Servs., Ltd., 888 F.2d 1175, 1181 (7th 
Cir. 1989); Houghton v. Ins. Crime Prevention Inst., 795 F.2d 322, 325 (3d Cir. 
1986))). 
 102. Id.  The district court held that, even though the reports were disclosed to 
the Imposter, the remaining disclosures were proper because they were made for 
permissible purposes under the FCRA and because TRW had procedures reasonably 
designed to prevent impermissible disclosures.  Id. at 1068-69.  Andrews’ second 
claim of inaccuracy was tried by a jury who found for TRW.  TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 
534 U.S. 19, 24 n.3 (2001).  Adelaide Andrews settled her claims with Trans Union; 
therefore, they did not proceed. 
 103. Andrews v. TRW, Inc., 225 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2000), rev’d, 534 U.S. 19 
(2001). 
 104. Id. at 1066 (quoting Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 
1260, 1266 (9th Cir. 1998)). 
 105. See id. at 1067 (quoting Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946), in 
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Congress, the Ninth Circuit applied a general discovery rule.106  The 
court’s decision was also an attempt to be consistent with an earlier 
decision in which the discovery rule was applied to actions under an 
analogous statute.107  Thus, Andrews’ claims against TRW for 
improper disclosure were reinstated.108 
C. The Supreme Court Opinion 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue of 
whether the statute of limitations in an action against a credit 
reporting agency under the FCRA begins when the plaintiff discovers 
the violation (the injury discovery rule) or when the violation initially 
occurs (violation occurrence rule).109  Andrews certainly faced an 
uphill battle; at least three circuits had already held that a general 
discovery rule does not apply to toll the statute of limitations in the 
FCRA.110  The Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s 
presumption that a discovery rule applies for all federal statute of 
limitations unless Congress expressly legislates otherwise.111  The 
Court concluded that congressional intent to deny a general 
discovery rule does not need to be explicit, as the Ninth Circuit had 
held, but can be implied from the text and structure of the statute.112 
                                                          
which the discovery rule was applied to a cause of action for fraud, and stating that 
the language of the FCRA and decisions of other circuits should yield to this 
Supreme Court principle). 
 106. See id. (holding that Andrews’ claims were not barred). 
 107. See id. (citing Englerius v. Veterans Admin., 837 F.2d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 1988), 
which interpreted the Privacy Act to include a discovery rule). 
 108. See id. (finding that none of Andrews’ claims were stale when she brought 
suit).  The Ninth Circuit also reversed the district court holding that TRW’s 
disclosures were permissible under the FCRA.  Id.  The Ninth Circuit, however, 
affirmed the district court on the accuracy claim, dismissing her accuracy claim 
under § 1681e(b), by finding that TRW had procedures reasonably designed to 
prevent impermissible disclosures.  Id. at 1068. 
 109. TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 532 U.S. 902 (2001); see TRW 534 U.S. 19, 26 (2001) 
(writing that the Court would look at the case to resolve a conflict between the Ninth 
Circuit and four other circuits:  the Third, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh). 
 110. See TRW, 534 U.S. at 26 (citing Clark v. State Farm Fire & Cas., 54 F.3d 669, 
672-73 (10th Cir. 1995); Rylewicz v. Beaton Servs., Ltd., 888 F.2d 1175, 1181 (7th Cir. 
1989); Houghton v. Ins. Crime Prevention Inst., 795 F.2d 322, 325 (3d Cir. 1986); 
Clay v. Equifax, 762 F.2d 952, 961 (11th Cir. 1985)). 
 111. See id. (stating that “beyond doubt, the Court has never endorsed the Ninth 
Circuit’s view that Congress can convey its refusal to adopt a discovery rule only by 
explicit command . . . .”). 
 112. See id. (stating that the Ninth Circuit erred “in holding that a generally 
applied discovery rule control[led the] case”). 
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The Court stated that it only recognized an injury discovery rule in 
certain circumstances.113  First, the Court has recognized the discovery 
rule in cases of fraud or concealment.114  In cases of fraud, the statute 
of limitations is tolled until discovery of the injury because the 
plaintiff is ignorant of it without any fault or lack of diligence on his 
part.115  Second, the Court has applied the discovery rule “where the 
cry for [such a] rule is loudest.”116  For example, in cases of latent 
disease or medical malpractice, the Court has implied a discovery 
rule, but only where a claim is brought under what it considers 
“humane” legislation.117  While noting that lower federal courts have 
applied the discovery rule when a statute is silent on the issue,118 the 
Supreme Court has refused to follow their lead.119  The Court 
concluded that because the FCRA is not silent on the issue and “does 
not govern an area of the law that cries out” for its application, the 
discovery rule does not apply.120 
The Supreme Court looked to statutory construction to show that  
§ 1681p precluded the discovery rule121 and relied on the principle of 
“expressio unius est exclusio alterius” to support its argument.122  The 
Court accepted the petitioner’s and the district court’s argument that 
when a statute explicitly enumerates certain exceptions, additional 
exceptions are not to be implied.123  The Court held that “Congress 
                                                          
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. (citing Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946)). 
 115. See id. (explaining that although Holmberg held that equity tolls the statute of 
limitations in cases of fraud, it did not “establish a general presumption applicable 
across all contexts”). 
 116. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555 
(2000)). 
 117. See id. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring) (referring to cases of medical malpractice 
and latent disease in which the court has recognized the discovery rule because the 
“humane” legislation, under which plaintiffs’ claims were brought, could not have 
been interpreted as being so unfair to plaintiffs in those circumstances (citing Urie v. 
Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170 (1949))); see, e.g., Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549 (2000) 
(recognizing the injury discovery rule in medical malpractice cases, but refusing to 
apply it in a RICO action); United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 122 (1979) 
(advocating an injury and causation discovery rule, under the Federal Torts Claims 
Act, in which the statute of limitations begins to run when a plaintiff knows he has 
been hurt and can identify the defendant). 
 118. See TRW, 534 U.S. at 27. 
 119. See id. (stating that “we have not adopted that position as our own.”). 
 120. See id. at 28 (suggesting that the FCRA is not silent because § 1681p addresses 
the statute of limitations issue, and that the FCRA is not considered humane 
legislation). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id.; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 602 (7th ed. 1999) (defining the Latin 
phrase as a “canon of construction holding that to express or include one thing 
implies the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative”). 
 123. See TRW, 534 U.S. at 28-29 (explaining that enumerating exceptions indicate 
congressional intent to preclude courts from including additional exceptions not 
listed); see also Petitioner’s Brief at 21, TRW (No. 00-1045) (advocating a traditional 
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implicitly excluded a general discovery rule by explicitly including a 
more limited one.”124 
Relying on the text of FCRA § 1681p, the Court explained that 
applying a general discovery rule would render the misrepresentation 
exception “superfluous.”125  As the Court explained, in an average 
case, the consumer will not discover an improper disclosure until she 
requests a credit report.126  If the credit reporting agency conceals the 
information, then both the discovery rule and the misrepresentation 
exception would toll the statute of limitations.127  When the concealed 
disclosure is discovered, the statute of limitations would begin to run 
under either rule.128  According to a hallmark of statutory 
interpretation, no word in a statute shall be superfluous, unless it 
cannot be prevente.129  Because the Court found that applying a 
general discovery rule would make the misrepresentation exception 
meaningless, it refused to extend the discovery rule beyond cases of 
misrepresentation or concealment.130 
Finally, the Court examined the legislative history of the statute of 
limitations in the FCRA and reaffirmed its conclusion that Congress 
did not intend to apply a general discovery rule to the FCRA.131  
Andrews argued that initial drafts of the FCRA had expressly 
included language that tolled the statute of limitations until the “date 
of the occurrence of the violation.”132  Because that language was 
replaced with the “liability arises” language, Andrews argued that 
Congress did not intend for the statute of limitations to begin when 
the violation occurred.133  This argument did not persuade the Court 
because the legislative history also showed that lawmakers rejected 
testimony that encouraged them to begin the running of the statute 
of limitations when the violation was discovered.134  In addition, the 
                                                          
commencement rule because the only exceptions Congress intended are expressly 
stated). 
 124. See TRW, 534 U.S. at 28 (stating that reading the exception into the rule 
would distort the statute’s text by turning the exception into the rule). 
 125. Id. at 29. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 31 (citing Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 32-33. 
 132. Id. at 32; see also Respondent’s Brief at 26, TRW (No. 00-1045) (suggesting 
that initial drafts of the FCRA would have expressly applied a violation occurrence 
rule). 
 133. See Respondent’s Brief at 28, TRW (No. 00-1045) (arguing that the final 
version’s lack of violation occurrence language is evidence of the congressional 
intent “to choose a more accommodating type of statute of limitations”). 
 134. See TRW, 534 U.S. at 33 (explaining that the legislative history is not 
dispositive). 
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Court noted that the misrepresentation exception was adopted at the 
same time the “date of occurrence” language was deleted.135  The 
Court explained that it was doubtful that Congress would create an 
exception and adopt a general discovery rule simultaneously.136 
This Supreme Court decision is devastating for identity theft 
victims as well as consumer protection advocates.137  The Court’s 
interpretation of the statutory language creates a significant burden 
on the victim of identity theft.138  Running the statute of limitations 
from the time of the initial FCRA violation forces victims to bear 
significant losses.139 
III. THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND THE CREDIT INDUSTRY CREATE BURDENS 
ON IDENTITY THEFT VICTIMS 
Despite the Supreme Court’s ruling, the prevalence of identity 
theft, the disastrous effects it has on victims and its connection to the 
credit reporting agencies, are evidence that the FCRA does cover an 
area of the law that “cries out” for application of the discovery rule.140  
In 1997, actual losses from identity theft to victims and financial 
institutions totaled $745 million.141  This figure, however, does not 
reflect the “human costs” suffered by the victims of identity theft, as 
cases like Adelaide Andrews’ reflect.142  While a victim of consumer 
identity theft will not be held liable for the debts incurred by identity 
thieves,143 they bear the burden of regaining their financial health 
and restoring their credit history.144  A study of sixty-six identity theft 
                                                          
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See Borrowers Beware, supra note 44, at 6 (objecting to Congress and the 
judiciary’s decision to limit the discovery rule to cases of misrepresentation). 
 138. See id. (explaining that victims could be barred from bringing an action to 
enforce the FCRA provisions if they do not review credit reports every two years). 
 139. See id. (arguing that the judiciary’s reliance on statutory construction is 
understandable but that Congress should reexamine its position because victims will 
lose their opportunity to recover damages for improper disclosures). 
 140. See id. (calling for Congress to consider the needs of victims of identity theft 
when applying a statute of limitations to the FCRA). 
 141. GAO REPORT, supra note 27, at 1. 
 142. See id. at 22 (explaining that emotional, financial, and opportunity costs can 
be substantial and that identity theft victims report feeling “violated”); see also 
NOWHERE TO TURN, supra note 67, at 4 (explaining that stress, emotional trauma, 
time lost, and damaged credit reputation, not the financial aspect of the fraud, were 
most difficult). 
 143. See 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a) (2000) (limiting liability of a cardholder for 
unauthorized credit card use to fifty dollars). 
 144. See July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 30 (statement of Beth Givens, 
Director, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse) (explaining that time and effort required to 
restore credit history can be frustrating); see also Margaret Mannix, Getting Serious 
About Identity Theft, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 8, 1999, at 88 (explaining that 
despite the FTC clearinghouse, the burden of clearing credit history is still on the 
SHOUDT.PRINTER THIS ONE.DOC 12/4/2002  1:35 PM 
2002] IDENTITY THEFT 357 
cases reported that it took an average of 175 hours and $808 in out-
of-pocket expenses to remedy the effects of consumer identity theft.145  
Victims suffer from loss of time and money, as well as stress, anxiety, 
embarrassment, and frustration.146  As Adelaide Andrews 
experienced, victims are continuously hounded by collection 
agencies and are refused credit because of the work of an imposter.147  
Besides the emotional trauma associated with a violation of privacy, 
victims face two primary burdens in their quest to rebuild their credit 
histories:  the statute of limitations for actions against credit 
reporting agencies and the inefficient procedures of the credit 
industry.148 
A.  Burdens Imposed Through the Legal System 
By ruling that the “text and structure” of the FCRA would not allow 
the courts to imply a discovery rule,149 the Supreme Court disregarded 
the new reality of identity theft and the plight of the victim.150  
Considering the recent rise in identity theft, Congress should revisit 
the statute of limitations issue in the FCRA and make it better reflect 
the true reality victims face.151  The arguments in favor of applying the 
violation occurrence rule to run the statute of limitations ignore the 
unique nature of identity theft,152 where many identity theft victims 
                                                          
victim). 
 145. See NOWHERE TO TURN, supra note 67, at 1 (explaining the findings of a study, 
conducted by CALPIRG and Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, on the obstacles victims 
face when trying to resolve identity theft cases). 
 146. See July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 32 (statement of Beth Givens, 
Director, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse) (stating that victims suffer anxiety and 
frustration because it can take years to restore their good credit history). 
 147. See Martha Sabol, The Identity Theft and Assumption  Deterrence Act of 1998 Do 
Individual Victims Finally Get Their Day in Court?, 11 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 165, 167-68 
(1999) (describing the difficult and humiliating process of rectifying a credit 
history). 
 148. See Morphy, supra note 17 (explaining that the statute of limitations and the 
poor procedures designed by the credit industry make a victim’s recovery difficult); 
see also Borrowers Beware, supra note 44, at 6 (recognizing the additional burden the 
statute of limitations decision creates for an already difficult and lengthy process of 
rectifying an erroneously negative credit history). 
 149. See TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 28 (2001) (concluding that the text 
and structure of § 1681p “evince Congress’ intent to preclude judicial implication of 
a discovery rule”). 
 150. See Brief of Amici Curiae the Nat’l Assoc. of Consumer Advocates et al. at 10-
11, TRW (No. 00-1045) (arguing that the credit reporting agencies have been 
ineffective in combating identity theft or assisting victims). 
 151. See Borrowers Beware, supra note 44, at 6 (advocating an amendment to the 
FCRA statute of limitations). 
 152. See Brief of Amici Curiae the Nat’l Assoc. of Consumer Advocates et al. at 12, 
TRW (No. 00-1045) (arguing that because identity theft victims do not learn of the 
crime for years, it would be unreasonable for the statute of limitations to begin 
running at the time of violation). 
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may not know the statute of limitations has started to run.153  
Although forty-five percent of victims discover the identity theft 
within a month, March 2001 data reported that twenty percent of 
victims do not realize their identities have been stolen until two years 
after it occurs.154  On average, it takes 12.5 months from the time an 
identity is stolen for the victim to realize it.155  Upon notification of 
identity theft, it then takes victims an average of two years to clear a 
credit history.156  In response to this data, TRW argued that the “vast 
majority” of identity theft victims discover their injuries before the 
statute of limitations has run out.157  However, the purpose of the 
FCRA as a consumer protection statute will be thwarted if any 
consumers lose their rights to hold a credit reporting agency liable 
for improper disclosures.158 
Many victims will also lose their opportunity to recover damages 
from a credit reporting agency for improper disclosures because, 
even if they discover the violation within the two-year window, they 
will not be able to file a claim before the statute of limitations 
expires.159  Andrews argued that because the FCRA is not a strict 
liability statute, it can take nearly two years to gather the information 
                                                          
 153. See id. (explaining that it would be an injustice for the statute of limitations to 
run before victims realize their identities have been stolen). 
 154. See FTC, IDENTITY THEFT VICTIM COMPLAINT DATA: FIGURES AND TRENDS ON 
IDENTITY THEFT, NOVEMBER 1999 THROUGH JUNE 2001 4 (2001) [hereinafter JUNE 2001 
DATA] (providing percentages of identity theft victims and the corresponding length 
of time it takes before the theft was discovered and stating that almost half of victims 
discover the injury within a month); MARCH 2001 DATA, supra note 32, at Figure 8 
(showing that twenty percent of victims learn of the problem two years after it occurs, 
which is significant compared to the forty-five percent who discover their identity 
theft within a month); see also FCRA Statute of Limitations Begins to Run at Time of 
Identity Theft, 38 BANKR. CT. DECISIONS 16, Nov. 27, 2001, at 5 (reviewing the oral 
arguments at the Supreme Court in which Andrews’ attorney stated that twenty 
percent of victims do not find out about the theft within two years). 
 155. JUNE 2001 DATA, supra note 154, at Figure 8; see MARCH 2001 DATA, supra note 
32, at Figure 8 (stating that the average number of months between occurrence and 
discovery is fifteen months); see also Beth Givens, Director, Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse, Identity Theft:  The Growing Problem of Wrongful Criminal 
Records, Presentation at the SEARCH National Conference on Privacy, Technology 
and Criminal Justice Information (June 1, 2000) [hereinafter SEARCH Presentation] 
(explaining that it takes an average of fourteen months to detect an identity theft), 
available at http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/wcr.htm (last visited Aug. 3, 2002). 
 156. SEARCH Presentation, supra note 155. 
 157. See Petitioner’s Reply Brief at 14-15, TRW (No. 00-1045) (arguing that the 
traditional statute of limitations is adequate because most victims discover the injury 
within two years). 
 158. See Borrowers Beware, supra note 44, at 6 (arguing that the statute of limitations 
on the FCRA should reflect the overall purpose of the statute, which is to advance 
efficiency in the banking and financial system and protect consumer privacy). 
 159. See Brief of Amici Curiae the Nat’l Assoc. of Consumer Advocates et al. at 10, 
TRW (No. 00-1045) (explaining that a victim has to “determine what transpired” and 
wait months to receive records from creditors concerning the fraudulent accounts). 
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necessary to bring a suit.160  Since the FCRA requires a showing of 
negligence, the discovery of an inaccuracy alone is not sufficient to 
bring a suit against a credit reporting agency.161  As Andrews argued, 
filing a claim also requires an examination into the legal standard of 
care to determine whether the defendant was negligent.162  
Therefore, a claim can take a substantial amount of time to prepare 
in order to avoid Rule ll sanctions.163  The initial purpose of the FCRA 
was to protect consumers by requiring procedures to maintain 
accuracy of credit reports.164  Applying the violation occurrence rule 
contradicts this consumer protection purpose because in many cases 
it can take the full two years to discover an identity theft or to file a 
claim.165 
The Court’s statutory construction analysis could also be 
challenged in light of the new crisis of identity theft.166  As Andrews 
argued, § 1681p could be read to incorporate the discovery rule.167  
Section 1681p begins running the statute of limitations when “liability 
arises.”168  Relying on the common definition of “arise,” Andrews 
argued that liability did not manifest itself until the victim became 
aware of the theft.169  TRW, on the other hand, argued that 
                                                          
 160. See Respondent’s Brief at 42-43, TRW (No. 00-1045) (explaining it can take 
two years from the time a victim discovers the identity theft for a victim to be 
sufficiently informed to bring a valid claim). 
 161. See id. at 43 (explaining that an examination into negligence standards, once 
the theft has been discovered, is necessary to avoid a frivolous lawsuit). 
 162. See id. at 43 n.30 (explaining that obtaining information on the standard of 
care is difficult because the credit industry is large and information is difficult to 
obtain). 
 163. See id. (arguing that the plaintiff would need two years to gather information 
and construct a well-informed lawsuit); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (requiring sanctions for 
frivolous lawsuits that are not well grounded in fact or law).  But see Petitioner’s Reply 
Brief at 15, TRW (No. 00-1045) (arguing that respondent failed to explain why it 
would take so long to file suit). 
 164. See Respondent’s Brief at 13, TRW (No. 00-1045) (quoting Burnett v. New 
York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 427 (1965) in which the Court emphasized the 
importance of considering the underlying purpose of a statute when interpreting a 
statute of limitations). 
 165. See Brief of Amici Curiae the Nat’l Assoc. of Consumer Advocates et al. at 13, 
TRW (No. 00-1045) (explaining that the violation occurrence rule would immunize 
credit reporting agencies from liability); see also Borrowers Beware, supra note 44, at 6 
(explaining that the goal of protecting consumers would be better served by 
beginning the statute of limitations at the time of discovery). 
 166. See Respondent’s Brief at 13, TRW (No. 00-1045) (arguing that the language 
of § 1681p could be read to apply the discovery rule). 
 167. See id. (proposing that if the common meaning of the word “arises” is applied 
to § 1681p, the statute expressly provides for the discovery accrual rule). 
 168. 15 U.S.C. § 1681p (2000). 
 169. See Respondent’s Brief at 13, TRW (No. 00-1045) (applying the common 
definition of “arise” to the language of § 1681p and arguing that not a single element 
of TRW’s liability “sprang up, came into notice, came up, or presented itself before 
May 31, 1995, when she first discovered any credit problem”).  But see Petitioner’s 
Brief at 15-16, TRW (No. 00-1045) (arguing that the liability arises at the time of the 
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traditionally a statute of limitations would begin when the plaintiff 
has a complete cause of action.170  Since the cause of action is 
complete and the credit reporting agency becomes liable at the 
moment it makes an improper disclosure, the liability “arises” at that 
point.171  To a victim of identity theft, however, the cause of action is 
not complete until the victim realizes a violation has occurred, which 
will be longer than two years in many cases.172 
The credit reporting agencies claim that the language of other 
FCRA statutory provisions, namely the “notice” and “access” 
provisions, are consistent with and support the application of a 
violation occurrence rule.173  The “notice” provision of the FCRA 
requires a creditor to inform the consumer promptly when any 
adverse action is taken and also identify the reporting agency that 
took such an action.174  The “access” provision requires a credit 
reporting agency to provide any information needed by the 
consumer to correct the improper disclosure.175  Therefore, the 
agencies argued, a plaintiff is well aware of the time the statute of 
limitations begins to run against a credit reporting agency, which 
makes a discovery rule unnecessary.176 
                                                          
initial improper disclosure because the FCRA provisions are violated at that time). 
 170. See Petitioner’s Brief at 14, TRW (No. 00-1045) (defining the traditional 
commencement rule, which begins the tolling of the statute of limitations once a 
person has been injured, regardless of whether the injury has been discovered). 
 171. See id. at 16 (explaining that at the time of the initial improper disclosure, the 
consumer’s privacy is invaded, the cause of action is complete, and the credit 
reporting agency becomes liable). 
 172. See Respondent’s Brief at 14, TRW (No. 00-1045) (illustrating how allowing 
the statute of limitations to run before the victim is aware of the identity theft and, 
thus, unable to bring an action is harsh and unreasonable). 
 173. See Petitioner’s Brief at 26, TRW (No. 00-1045) (arguing on behalf of credit 
reporting agencies that a discovery rule would conflict with other provisions of the 
FCRA and the overall statutory scheme).  But see Respondent’s Brief at 40, TRW (No. 
00-1045) (arguing that the notice and access provisions are ineffective). 
 174. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a) (2000) (providing that “if any person takes any 
adverse action with respect to any consumer that is based in whole or in part on any 
information contained in a consumer report, the person shall—(1) provide . . . 
notice of the adverse action to the consumer” and (2) provide the name of the 
consumer reporting agency that furnished the report). 
 175. See id. § 1681g(a)(1) (stating that “[e]very consumer reporting agency shall, 
upon request . . . clearly and accurately disclose to the consumer:  (1) all information 
in the consumer’s file at the time of the request . . . .”); see also Petitioner’s Brief at 
27, TRW (No. 00-1045) (arguing that the access provision gives consumers the means 
to identify improper disclosures). 
 176. See Petitioner’s Brief at 27-28, TRW (No. 00-1045) (asserting that the 
provisions make the discovery rule inapplicable because they allow victims to discover 
inaccuracies in a timely fashion but also admitting that because the Act does not 
require notification for a request for an ordinary credit report, the Act does not 
automatically notify the consumer of every potential disclosure). 
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This argument, however, fails to take into account the techniques 
identity thieves use.177  The notice provision does not adequately 
protect an identity theft victim because imposters usually submit a 
change of address immediately after applying for credit.178  Therefore, 
notice of adverse action will be sent to the imposter’s address or some 
other fraudulent address.179  Because a credit reporting agency will 
usually accept a change of address without question, the victim will 
not receive notice of any adverse action.180  For example, TRW 
committed four privacy violations before Andrews became aware of 
them.181  Andrews realized the violations only when she tried to 
refinance her home, not through any notification from TRW.182 
The access provision also fails to sufficiently protect a possible 
victim.183  This provision only requires a credit reporting agency to 
disclose information when there is reason to suspect an improper 
disclosure.184  With identity theft, however, the victim has no reason to 
suspect an improper disclosure until after much time has elapsed and 
when the statute of limitations may have run.185 
The application of the violation occurrence rule in identity theft 
cases under the FCRA is further inappropriate because the potential 
plaintiffs have become victims through no fault of their own.186  In 
other cases, the Supreme Court applied the injury discovery rule 
when the plaintiff was unaware of the injury for some time.187  In 
                                                          
 177. See Brief of Amici Curiae Nat’l Assoc. of Consumer Advocates et al. at 15, 
TRW (No. 00-1045) (arguing that an imposter often changes the address on 
accounts, preventing the victim from receiving notice). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id.; see also Eric Rich, Fraud Made Easy:  The Credit Industry Does Little to Protect 
Consumers From Identity Theft, HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 18, 2001, at A8 (reporting 
that credit bureaus are not required to verify a change of address).  If credit bureaus 
sent a confirmation of change of address, fraud could be prevented. Id. 
 181. See Respondent’s Brief at 41, TRW (No. 00-1045) (noting that Andrews 
received no notice and was only made aware of the privacy violations ten months 
after the first violation). 
 182. See id. (explaining that only the Imposter received the notifications from the 
reporting agency because the Imposter had changed the address when opening the 
fraudulent accounts). 
 183. Id. 
 184. See id. (explaining that a consumer will request information and their credit 
file once there is reason to believe there has been an improper disclosure). 
 185. See id. at 42 (explaining that although identity theft victims are vigilant about 
obtaining records when they know their identities have been stolen, most will not 
have the knowledge that they should be suspicious until well after the violation 
occurred). 
 186. See March 7, 2000 Hearings, supra note 24, at 12 (statement of Maureen 
Mitchell, victim) (explaining that “[w]e were thrown into a financial quagmire 
through no carelessness on our part.”). 
 187. See, e.g., Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 167 (1949) (applying the injury 
discovery rule in a workers compensation case because the plaintiff could not have 
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Holmberg v. Armbrecht,188 the Court applied the discovery rule to a case 
of fraud.189  The Court specifically stated “that where a plaintiff has 
been injured by fraud and ‘remains in ignorance of it without any 
fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute 
does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered.’”190 
In Urie v. Thompson,191 the Court examined whether the three-year 
statute of limitations in the Federal Employer’s Liability Act barred 
Urie’s claim for compensation for work-related silicosis, a pulmonary 
disease.192  The Court stated that it was unlikely that “the humane 
legislative plan intended such consequences to attach to blameless 
ignorance.”193  Similarly, in cases of medical malpractice, the Court 
has endorsed the injury discovery rule because a plaintiff often will 
not learn of the injury until some time after it occurs, despite any 
diligence the plaintiff used.194 
In United States v. Kubrick,195 a veteran brought a medical 
malpractice claim against a Veteran’s Administration hospital under 
the Federal Tort Claims Act.196  The Court held that the two-year 
statute of limitations begins when the plaintiff knows of the existence 
and cause of his injury.197  The statute of limitations is tolled until the 
plaintiff discovers that he may have a legal claim.198  The Court 
distinguished between instances where a plaintiff’s injury is 
unknowable and the facts pertaining to causation are under the 
                                                          
known about his injury). 
 188. 327 U.S. 392 (1946). 
 189. See id. at 397 (applying the discovery rule in a case in which the plaintiff sued 
shareholders and later discovered that one shareholder had concealed his ownership 
interests).  The Court applied the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations for 
an action against the fraudulent shareholder based on equity principles.  Id. 
 190. Id. (quoting Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 348 (1874)). 
 191. 337 U.S. 163 (1949). 
 192. See id. at 169 (rejecting defendant’s claim that Urie’s case should be barred 
by the statute of limitations because Urie could have contracted the disease as early 
as 1910). 
 193. Id. at 170. 
 194. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 122-24 (1979) (applying discovery 
rule in a case of medical malpractice); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae the FTC at 25, 
TRW (No. 00-1045) (explaining that in some cases the plaintiff will not learn of an 
injury until well after it is inflicted and sometimes diligence may be fruitless). 
 195. 444 U.S. at 111. 
 196. See id. at 113 (explaining that Kubrick sued under the Federal Torts Claim 
Act for loss of hearing he experienced after surgery at a Veteran’s Administration 
hospital); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2000) (barring any claim against the U.S. 
unless it is presented within “two years after such claim accrues” to the appropriate 
federal agency). 
 197. See Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 122 (holding that a plaintiff who knows of the facts 
and is aware of his injury will not benefit from a longer statute of limitations because 
it is his responsibility to inquire whether the facts establish a legal claim). 
 198. See id. (explaining that the plaintiff who knows he has been injured is no 
longer at the mercy of the defendants). 
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control of the defendant, and instances in which a plaintiff knows of 
his injury but not his legal rights.199  In the latter, all the plaintiff must 
do is inquire as to whether he has a cause of action.200  In Kubrick, the 
plaintiff knew of his injury, but did not know that he could have 
made a legal claim for medical malpractice.201  Because he only 
needed to inquire about his legal rights, the court would not allow 
Kubrick to benefit from a longer statute of limitations.202  The 
plaintiff’s discovery of the facts of his injury began the running of the 
statute of limitations.203  Although Kubrick was not allowed to benefit 
from a longer statute of limitations, the court did not rule out the 
possibility that the discovery rule could be applied in other cases 
brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act where the claimant did 
not possess the relevant facts about the injury.204    
In these cases, the Acts under which the plaintiffs brought their 
claims were considered “humane” legislation for which it would be 
inequitable to run the limitations period from the time the violation 
of the Act occurred.205  The Court in TRW refused to analogize 
Andrews’ identity theft to these medical malpractice, disease and 
fraud suits, claiming that the FCRA does not cover an area of the law 
that “cries out” for the discovery rule in the same way.206 
The new phenomenon of identity theft and the burdens innocent 
victims face demonstrate the need to regard the FCRA as “humane” 
legislation.207  The plight of an identity theft victim is similar to that of 
the plaintiffs in cases of fraud or latent disease because identity theft 
                                                          
 199. See id. (stating that “[w]e are unconvinced that for statute of limitations 
purposes a plaintiff’s ignorance of his legal rights and his ignorance of the fact of his 
injury or its cause should receive identical treatment.”). 
 200. Id. 
 201. See id. at 123 (explaining that Kubrick only needed to ask doctors whether his 
hearing loss was due to the treatment he received for surgery). 
 202. See id. (describing that the statute of limitations will not wait to run until 
plaintiff is aware that the injury was negligently inflicted). 
 203. See id. (explaining that to excuse the plaintiff from inquiring as to his cause 
of action would undermine the purpose of the statute of limitations). 
 204.  Id. at 124. 
 205. See TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 37 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(explaining that the Court “could not imagine that legislation as ‘humane’ as the 
Federal Employers’ Liability Act would bar recovery for latent medical injuries”). 
 206. See id. (noting that cases where the statute of limitations should be suspended 
are limited in character and should be admitted with great caution); see also Rotella v. 
Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555 (2000) (describing that the “cry for the rule is loudest” in 
medical malpractice claims). 
 207. See March 7, 2000 Hearings, supra note 24, at 12 (statement of Maureen 
Mitchell, victim) (describing that victims suffer financial and emotional trauma 
through no fault of their own, and stating that victims need to repeatedly fill out 
forms and affidavits that are required by individual merchants in order to prove their 
innocence). 
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victims are also “blamelessly ignorant” of the injury.208  As cases like 
Andrews show, identity theft plagues consumers who have been 
vigilant in keeping their financial situations in good order.209  
Applying the principle set out in Kubrick, Andrews was aware of 
neither her injury nor her legal rights.210  The defendants and the 
Imposter were the only parties that knew of the improper disclosures 
until Adelaide Andrews applied for a mortgage.211  Therefore, 
according to the Kubrick rationale, the statute of limitations should 
not run until Andrews discovered the theft.212 
In her brief, Andrews emphasized that the discovery rule also has 
been applied in cases where plaintiffs seek damages for both physical 
and economic harms.213  In an identity theft case, the plaintiff suffers 
both economic and physical damages.214  Because the injury discovery 
rule is not limited to a specific type of injury or plaintiff, equity 
commands application of the rule in identity theft cases as well.215 
The Supreme Court found that the legislative history of the FCRA 
fails to show that the discovery rule could be implied in § 1681p.216  
Both TRW and Andrews found language in the legislative history of 
the FCRA that supported their differing views.217  Any arguments 
                                                          
 208. See id. (stating that the victim did nothing wrong but still incurred a negative 
credit history). 
 209. See July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 25 (statement of Michelle Brown, 
victim) (“It is astounding that my life long discipline to be a law abiding citizen and 
to have the diligence to establish perfect credit was reversed so easily, so quickly, 
simply because I represent the perfect victim in another’s eyes.”); May 20, 1998 
Hearings, supra note 8, at 19 (statement of David Medine, Associate Director Credit 
Practices, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (explaining that identity thieves 
usually seek to victimize people with good credit history so the scam works). 
 210. Andrews v. Trans Union Corp., 7 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1998); see 
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 122 (1979) (distinguishing plaintiffs who 
know they have been injured and those that are unaware of the injury). 
 211. See Andrews, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1064 (describing how Andrews discovered that 
her identity had been stolen when she attempted to refinance the mortgage on her 
home). 
 212. See Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 122 (explaining that where facts are unavailable to 
plaintiff, the statute of limitations should be applied differently than where a plaintiff 
knows he is injured). 
 213. See Respondent’s Brief at 19, TRW (No. 00-1045) (arguing that Zenith Radio 
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 339 (1971), stands for the 
proposition that a cause of action under the Clayton Act does not accrue until the 
plaintiff suffers and feels the effect of an injury). 
 214. See id. at 7 (describing the economic and physical stress Andrews 
experienced, such as the exacerbation of Andrews’ pre-existing rheumatoid 
arthritis). 
 215. See id. at 21 (arguing that the discovery rule has been applied irrespective of 
type of plaintiff or injury). 
 216. TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 33 (2001). 
 217. See Respondent’s Brief at 27, TRW (No. 00-1045) (arguing that congressional 
intent to apply the discovery rule can be found because language that applied a 
violation occurrence rule was specifically deleted in the final version of the FCRA).  
But see Petitioner’s Brief at 36, TRW (No. 00-1045) (explaining that Congress was 
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based on the legislative history of the FCRA, however, would not be 
instructive because identity theft was not a “national crisis” in 1970 
when the FCRA was enacted.218  Considering the relatively new 
emergence of identity theft and the attention it has recently received 
from Congress, it is evident that reliance on legislative history would 
be misplaced.219 
B. Inefficient Procedures in the Credit Reporting Industry Impose  
Additional Burdens 
The statute of limitations is not the only burden victims of identity 
theft face.220  The overall effect of any proposal to assist a victim in the 
remediation process will be limited because the credit industry’s 
procedures designed to help victims are inefficient.221  The credit 
reporting agencies claim that the solution to identity theft is the 
more aggressive prosecution of identity thieves.222  These agencies, 
however, play an integral role in preventing identity theft and in 
establishing better procedures to help victims clear their credit 
history.223  Just as Andrews claimed, these entities “have both helped 
perpetuate identity theft and have made it difficult for victims to 
resolve their cases expeditiously.”224  The procedures a victim must 
                                                          
aware of the problems of discovering injuries from credit reports and still rejected a 
proposal to apply a discovery rule). 
 218. See Hoar, supra note 9, at *1 (claiming that identity theft is the “crime of the 
new millennium”). 
 219. See Petitioner’s Reply Brief at 13-14, TRW (No. 00-1045) (arguing that 
Congress was not concerned with identity theft in 1970). 
 220. See Morphy, supra note 17 (explaining that the statute of limitations and the 
credit industry’s procedures create obstacles for a victim of identity theft); see generally 
IDENTITY THEFT WORKSHOP, supra note 36 (recounting countless stories of victims who 
have been further victimized by the credit industry). 
 221. See NOWHERE TO TURN, supra note 67, at 1 (explaining that data shows a 
failure of law enforcement, government, and the credit industry to address the 
problem); see also Brief of Amici Curiae the Nat’l Assoc. of Consumer Advocates et al. 
at 13, TRW (00-1045) (stating that the consumers experience victimization after the 
initial fraud by creditors and credit reporting agencies). 
 222. See Rich, supra note 180, at A8 (explaining that the credit industry opposes 
reform); see also Press Release, Associated Credit Bureaus, Credit Reporting Industry 
Announces Identity Theft Initiatives (Mar. 14, 2000) (reporting that although the 
credit industry will implement voluntary initiatives, the problem will not be solved 
unless law enforcement aggressively prosecutes criminals), available at 
http://www.cdiaonline.org/mediaroomdocs/IdentityTheftInitiatives.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 3, 2002). 
 223. See March 7, 2000 Hearings, supra note 24, at 13 (statement of Maureen 
Mitchell, victim) (stating that credit reporting agencies and merchants have the 
“onus of responsibility”); see also July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 31 
(statement of Beth Givens, Director, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse) (arguing that the 
credit industry must improve their victim assistance programs). 
 224. NOWHERE TO TURN, supra note 67, at 1-2; see Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 
Identity Theft Victim Stories: The Credit Grantor’s Facilitated the Identity Theft Crime (stating 
that creditors “facilitate identity theft through their policies and practices”), available 
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follow to rectify the mess created by an identity thief can be confusing 
and time consuming.225 
When a consumer becomes aware they are a victim of identity 
theft, he or she is told to notify, by phone and mail, each of the three 
credit reporting agencies and all creditors.226  Thus, victims must 
prove their innocence to each company independently.227  Many 
victims report that this process is particularly aggravating because 
“the victim of identity theft is assumed guilty until proven 
innocent.”228 
Victims of identity theft also have pointed to a series of 
inefficiencies and inconsistencies in reporting fraud to the credit 
reporting agencies.229  First, each credit reporting agency has 
different procedures, requiring different information and 
documentation from victims.230  Second, the credit reporting agencies 
do not communicate effectively, and a fraud alert or suspicious 
activity on one agency’s report will likely be left out of another.231  
Third, despite the credit reporting agencies’ obligation to remove 
inaccurate data,232 fraudulent accounts often will reappear in a later 
                                                          
at http://www.privacyrights.org/victim18.htm (last visited Aug. 3, 2002). 
 225. See NOWHERE TO TURN, supra note 67, at 5 (reporting that seventy-eight 
percent of respondents indicated loss of time as their main concern stemming from 
identity theft). 
 226. See July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 9-10 (statement of Jodie Bernstein, 
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (describing the process of 
remedying the effects of identity theft). 
 227. See March 7, 2000 Hearings, supra note 24, at 11 (statement of Maureen 
Mitchell, victim) (explaining that she sent dozens of affidavits, letters, forms, and 
handwriting samples to credit reporting agencies, and needed to prove her 
innocence thirty different times to thirty different merchants). 
 228. Id.; see IDENTITY THEFT WORKSHOP, supra note 36, at 34 (remarks of Deborah 
North, victim) (“[T]hat was the beginning of a long process, a lot of work, and time, 
to prove your innocence . . . . You know, normally you’re innocent until proven 
guilty, but in this case, it’s the opposite.”). 
 229. See generally July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 34 (statement of Beth 
Givens, Director, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse) (reviewing the most common 
complaint of victims of identity theft); IDENTITY THEFT WORKSHOP, supra note 36, at  
34-55 (discussing how the procedures used by credit reporting agencies make 
recovery difficult). 
 230. See IDENTITY THEFT WORKSHOP, supra note 36, at 95 (remarks of Maxine 
Sweed, Experian Information Systems, Inc.) (noting all three agencies have different 
processes for handling consumer complaints of fraud); see also Ways and Means 
Hearings, supra note 2, at 14 (statement of Emeka Moneme, victim) (describing one 
of her frustrations as the lack of uniformity across the three credit bureaus). 
 231. See IDENTITY THEFT WORKSHOP, supra note 36, at 149 (remarks of Bhavna 
Bhagwakar, Volkswagon Financing Co.) (acknowledging that the lack of consistency 
between credit reporting agencies’ fraud alerts can lead to mistake in the approval 
process). 
 232. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681i(a)(5)(A)-(C) (2000) (explaining that credit reporting 
agencies shall promptly delete inaccurate data and shall maintain procedures to 
prevent reappearance). 
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credit report, leading to continuous denials of credit for the victim.233  
Fourth, the credit bureaus do not monitor the number of inquiries 
made to an account234 and often cannot readily give the victim the 
name and address of every company that made such an inquiry.235 
Creditors’ lack of security at the point of transaction creates an 
equally significant burden on the victim of identity theft.236  Identity 
thieves can easily use pre-approved credit cards sent through the mail 
by banks and creditors.237  Moreover, as Adelaide Andrews’ case 
proves, many creditors approve transactions despite obvious mistakes 
made by the imposter.238  Fraud alerts also are often ineffective 
because they are not prominently displayed.239  Because the alert can 
appear on the last page of a report, creditors do not see it and 
continue to issue credit to the identity thief.240  Currently, creditors 
                                                          
 233. See Ways and Means Hearings, supra note 2, at 14 (statement of Emeka 
Moneme, victim) (recounting that she had to overcome the additional problem of 
reappearing deleted accounts); NOWHERE TO TURN, supra note 67, at 7 (explaining 
that one roadblock victims complained of was reappearance of fraudulent accounts); 
see also IDENTITY THEFT WORKSHOP, supra note 36, at 117 (remarks of Edmund 
Mierzwinski, U.S. Public Interest Research Group) (stating that reappearance should 
not happen because the 1996 amendments to FCRA created an individual’s private 
right of action to sue credit bureaus if they failed to comply with reinvestigation 
procedures). 
 234. See Rich, supra note 180, at A8-A9 (explaining that credit bureaus do not 
monitor consumer profiles for obvious signs of identity theft); see also March 7, 2000 
Hearings, supra note 24, at 17 (statement of Maureen Mitchell, victim) (stating that 
her credit report, reflecting twenty- five inquiries in sixty days, did not send a “red 
flag” to the credit reporting agency). 
 235. See IDENTITY THEFT WORKSHOP, supra note 36, at 36 (remarks of Nicole 
Robinson, victim) (recalling that only one credit reporting agency was able to 
immediately give the victim a list of recent inquiries). 
 236. See NOWHERE TO TURN, supra note 67, at 7 (noting that many victims claim 
that creditor negligence caused the problem and that “the credit industry had 
perpetuated, rather than prevented, the problem”). 
 237. See Rich, supra note 180, at A8 (explaining that identity thieves steal pre-
approved credit cards, change the address, and obtain more pre-approved cards at 
the new address, which leads to further damage). 
 238. See Andrews v. TRW, Inc., 225 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2000) (describing 
that the commercial credit agency approved credit based on obvious mistakes 
submitted by the Imposter, such as misspelling Andrews’ first name); see also Ways and 
Means Hearings, supra note 2, at 10 (statement of Nicole Robinson, victim) 
(describing the various fraudulent names, addresses, and social security numbers 
that her imposter used); March 7, 2000 Hearings, supra note 24, at 19 (statement of 
Maureen Mitchell, victim) (explaining that some fraudulent applications contained 
blatant errors that should have alerted merchants). 
 239. NOWHERE TO TURN, supra note 67, at 14; see Ways and Means Hearings, supra 
note 2, at 10 (statement of Nicole Robinson, victim) (stating that some credit was 
extended even after fraud alerts were placed on credit reports); March 7, 2000 
Hearings, supra note 24, at 15 (statement of Maureen Mitchell, victim) 
(recommending that fraud alerts appear on front page of a credit report). 
 240. See IDENTITY THEFT WORKSHOP, supra note 36, at 58 (remarks of Nicole 
Robinson, victim) (claiming that fraud alerts were put on her credit report in April, 
but the identity thief had opened new accounts in May and June); see also July 12, 
2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 30 (statement of Michelle Brown, victim) (stating 
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are not liable for disregarding a fraud alert, and the victim must wait 
to dispute the unauthorized charges.241  Because the loss from identity 
theft is insignificant to creditors, they lack any incentive to pursue 
identity theft cases.242 
Finally, a lack of communication with creditors places one of the 
most significant burdens on victims.243  Obtaining the fraudulent 
billing statement and credit applications as evidence of the fraud is 
difficult.244 While creditors are required to send the victim a fraud 
affidavit to verify the fraudulent accounts, this does not always 
occur.245  Not only is it difficult to request and receive a fraud 
affidavit,246 but victims must also complete a separate affidavit for each 
creditor, each of which requires similar information.247  It is apparent 
from victim complaints that even if victims like Adelaide Andrews had 
filed their claims within the statute of limitations, they would be 
further victimized by the credit industry’s lax security procedures.248  
One can only speculate as to how the needless trauma that Adelaide 
Andrews and many other victims suffered, could have been prevented 
had the credit industry’s procedures and policies been more secure, 
effective, and consumer-friendly. 
                                                          
that fraud alerts should be clearly posted and fines should be imposed on creditors 
that disregard the fraud alert). 
 241. See Rich, supra note 180, at A8 (reporting there is no penalty for ignoring a 
fraud alert); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1681I (2000) (explaining procedures for disputing 
information on a consumer report). 
 242. See Katherine Millett, Self Preservation to Restore Her Good Name, Elizabeth Knowles 
Was Up Against Both an Identity Thief and Official Indifference, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 19, 2001, 
(Magazine), at 12 (stating that according to a Ford Motor Credit spokesman, “[f]or 
the company to expend its resources on an identity theft case, . . . the case must 
involve a big loss, diligent police investigators, a committed prosecutor and a victim 
who is willing to devote the time needed to be an effective witness.”). 
 243. See March 7, 2000 Hearings, supra note 24, at 11 (statement of Maureen 
Mitchell, victim) (explaining that she encountered “answering machine hell” when 
contacting creditors). 
 244. See IDENTITY THEFT WORKSHOP, supra note 36, at 49 (remarks of Nicole 
Robinson, victim) (describing the difficulties in obtaining fraudulent bills and 
affidavits from the creditors); see also Ways and Means Hearings, supra note 2, at 14 
(statement of Emeke Moneme, victim) (stating that none of the thirteen letters she 
has written to creditors have been answered and the fraudulent information remains 
on her report). 
 245. See IDENTITY THEFT WORKSHOP, supra note 36, at 50 (remarks of Joe Genera, 
victim) (reporting that many creditors have failed to send an affidavit, even though 
they are required to do so). 
 246. See id. (claiming that only five out of fourteen creditors sent him an affidavit). 
 247. See March 7, 2000 Hearings, supra note 24, at 47 (question of Sen. Dianne 
Feinstein) (asking if it is possible to draft a single standardized document that would 
be accepted by all creditors and credit bureaus). 
 248. See supra notes 234-240 and accompanying text (describing the credit 
reporting agencies’ failure to protect against fraudulent applications). 
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IV. THE FTC RESPONSE TO IDENTITY THEFT 
Congress and the federal government have not completely ignored 
the issue of identity theft and its effect on innocent victims.249  On 
October 30, 1998, President Clinton signed the Identity Theft and 
Assumption Deterrence Act (“ITADA”) to address the growing 
problem of identity theft.250  ITADA amends 18 U.S.C. § 1028 to make 
it a federal crime when anyone “knowingly transfers or uses, without 
lawful authority, a means of identification of another person with the 
intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any unlawful activity.”251  While 
the criminal code previously addressed fraudulent documents, 
ITADA amended federal law to include the theft of identifying 
information.252 
Significantly, ITADA recognizes the needs of victims of identity 
theft.253  First, ITADA entitles victims to restitution.254 Before ITADA, 
only the financial institution that recorded the loss was entitled to 
recovery and restitution;255 the victim did not have legal standing256 
                                                          
 249. See, e.g., H.R. 4311—The Identity Theft Prevention Act of 2000:  Hearing Before the 
House Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs., 106th Cong. 3 (2000) (introducing a bill that 
would require credit bureaus to establish procedures to assist victims). See generally 
GAO REPORT, supra note 27 (studying the prevalence of identity theft); FTC, U.S. 
Government’s Central Website on Identity Theft (establishing a website, maintained 
by the FTC, providing information for consumers to prevent identity theft and assist 
those that are victimized), at http://www.ftc.gov/idtheft (last visited Aug. 3, 2002). 
 250. Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, Pub. L. No. 105-318, 112 Stat. 
3007 (1998) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) (2000)); see May 20, 
1998 Hearings, supra note 8, at 13 (statement of James Bauer, Deputy Assistant 
Director, Office of Investigations of the U.S. Secret Service) (explaining that law 
enforcement officials consider enactment of ITADA to be “a proactive answer to 
what [was] being handled in a reactive manner”); Paul A. Greenberg, Identity Fraud—
The Great E-Commerce Roadblock, ECOMMERCETIMES, July 12, 2001 (reporting that 
Lawrence William was the first person tried under ITADA after being charged with 
fourteen counts of identity fraud), available at http://www.ecommercetimes.com/ 
perl/story/11932.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2002). 
 251. 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7); see also id. § 1028(d)(3) (defining “means of 
identification” as including name, social security number, date of birth, driver’s 
license, or identification number). 
 252. See May 20, 1998 Hearings, supra note 8, at 13 (statement of James Bauer, 
Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Investigations of the U.S. Secret Service) 
(explaining before ITADA, “the predicate offense of stealing someone’s identity to 
create counterfeit and/or fictitious documents gained little or no attention” and “the 
focus had been on the ultimate criminal objective”). 
 253. See 144 CONG. REC. S9503 (daily ed. July 30, 1998) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl) 
(arguing that ITADA recognizes the victim and the crime of identity theft while 
previous law did not). 
 254. S. REP. NO. 105-274, at 4 (1998); see also May 20, 1998 Hearings, supra note 8, 
at 21 n.47 (statement of David Medine, Associate Director Credit Practices, Bureau of 
Consumer Protection, FTC) (explaining that ITADA grants consumer victims rights 
of restitution for costs incurred in clearing credit history, including civil or 
administrative proceedings that may occur). 
 255. See May 20, 1998 Hearings, supra note 8, at 20 (statement of David Medine, 
Associate Director Credit Practices, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) 
SHOUDT.PRINTER THIS ONE.DOC 12/4/2002  1:35 PM 
370 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:339 
and was entitled to no recovery.257 
Second, ITADA authorizes the FTC to take a proactive role in 
assisting victims of identity theft.258  Section 5 of ITADA directs the 
FTC to establish, not later than one year after the date of enactment, 
a Centralized Complaint and Consumer Education Service for 
Victims of Identity Theft.259  In particular, ITADA commands the FTC 
to establish procedures to “log and acknowledge the receipt of 
complaints by individuals who certify that they have a reasonable 
belief that one or more of their means of identification have been 
assumed, stolen or otherwise unlawfully acquired.”260  ITADA also 
requires the FTC to provide informational materials to identity theft 
victims and to refer complaints to appropriate entities, including the 
three major credit bureaus and law enforcement.261 
Interestingly, Congress gave the FTC a central role under ITADA, 
even though it is a civil agency with no criminal enforcement 
authority.262  Because its mission is to promote consumer protection, 
the FTC, operating through the FTC Act,263 is authorized to create 
                                                          
(explaining that before ITADA was enacted, the financial institution was considered 
the only victim); see also United States v. Karro, 257 F.3d 112, 121 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(holding that an upward departure in sentencing under ITADA was appropriate 
because of the nonmonetary harm to victims). 
 256. See March 7, 2000 Hearings, supra note 24, at 12 (statement of Maureen 
Mitchell, victim) (explaining that she and her husband were not treated as true 
victims, and could not sue until ITADA was passed). 
 257. See 143 CONG. REC. S2742 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1997) (statement of Sen. Jon 
Kyl) (recounting story of Bob Hartle who spent over $10,000 to clear his name but 
was unable to receive restitution for his expense). 
 258. See Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, Pub. L. No. 105-318, § 5, 
112 Stat. 3007 (1998) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) (2000)) 
(requiring the FTC to design a Centralized Complaint and Consumer Education 
Service for Victims of Identity Theft); 144 CONG. REC. S9503 (daily ed. July 30, 1998) 
(statement of Sen. Jon Kyl) (explaining that the FTC program provides “real time 
relief” to victims); see also GAO REPORT, supra note 27, at 2 (stating that before 
ITADA was enacted, no federal agency had overall jurisdiction regarding identity 
theft); Hoar, supra note 9, at *3 (explaining how the Department of Justice, the FTC, 
and other agencies work together to prevent, investigate, and prosecute identity 
thieves). 
 259. Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act § 5. 
 260. Id. § 5(a)(1). 
 261. Id. § 5(a)(2)-(3). 
 262. See Summary of Proceedings, National Summit on Identity Theft (Mar. 15-16, 
2000) (explaining that the FTC is a civil agency that has been given the responsibility 
for identifying and preventing identity theft without criminal enforcement 
authority), available at http://www.securityunit.com/other/  natifoc.htm (last visited 
Aug. 10, 2002); see also March 7, 2000 Hearings, supra note 24, at 34 n.20 (statement of 
Jodie Bernstein, Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (explaining most 
identity theft cases are addressed through criminal prosecution, but FTC only has 
civil authority). 
 263. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2000); see May 20, 1998 
Hearings, supra note 8, at 18 (statement of David Medine, Associate Director Credit 
Practices, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (stating that the FTCA “provides 
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this Centralized Complaint and Consumer Education Service.264  
Additional statutes give the FTC authority to create and enforce rules 
relating to specific industries involved in identity theft, such as credit 
reporting agencies.265  Because identity theft is integrally related to 
the credit industry and its control over identification materials, 
“examining the causes and consequences of identity theft and 
exploring potential solutions fall within the scope of the 
Commission’s mandate.”266  Specifically, the FTC’s role is to assist 
victims and law enforcement by collecting and sharing information 
from public and private entities.267 
A. The FTC Initiatives under the Identity Theft and                    
Assumption Deterrence Act 
To satisfy its obligations under ITADA, the FTC established three 
programs focusing on prevention, protection, and assisting victims.268  
The goal of the FTC programs is to act as an information 
clearinghouse that is designed to: 
                                                          
the Commission with broad law enforcement authority over entities engaged in or 
whose business affects commerce”); see also On Line Fraud:  Are Consumers Safe?:  
Hearing Before the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, 
and Consumer Prot., 107th Cong. 20 (2001) [hereinafter May 23, 2001 Hearings] 
(statement of Eileen Harrington, Associate Director of Marketing Practices, FTC) 
(explaining the FTC’s jurisdiction over the entire economy, including the Internet, is 
unique because other federal agencies only have jurisdiction over specific markets or 
industries). 
 264. See May 20, 1998 Hearings, supra note 8, at 18 (statement of David Medine, 
Associate Director Credit Practices, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (stating 
that the mission of the FTC is “to promote the efficient functioning of the 
marketplace by protecting consumers from unfair or deceptive acts or practices and 
increasing consumer choice by ensuring vigorous competition”). 
 265. See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681u (2000) 
(requiring credit bureaus to ensure accuracy of consumer credit reports by 
investigating disputed records and limiting disclosure of credit reports to only 
permissible purposes); Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666-1666j (2000) 
(requiring creditors to correct billing mistakes and limiting liability for unauthorized 
credit card use). 
 266. See May 20, 1998 Hearings, supra note 8, at 18 (statement of David Medine, 
Associate Director Credit Practices, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) 
(explaining that FTC became involved in identity theft issues in 1996 when it 
conducted two public meetings); see also April 22, 1999 Hearings, supra note 22, at 20 
(statement of Jodie Bernstein, Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) 
(commenting that “[a]s an outgrowth of its broader concern about financial privacy, 
the Commission has been involved in the issue of identity theft for some time”). 
 267. See April 22, 1999 Hearings, supra note 22, at 21-22 (statement of Jodie 
Bernstein, Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (explaining that the FTC 
will serve “as a central, federal source of information”). 
 268. See id. (outlining the components of (1) the toll-free telephone hotline, 
(2) the identity theft complaint database, and (3) consumer education materials); see 
also MARCH 2001 DATA, supra note 32, at 6 (describing programs established by FTC 
under ITADA). 
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1) support criminal law enforcement efforts by collecting data in 
one central database and making referrals as appropriate; 2) to 
provide consumers with information to help them prevent or 
minimize their risk of identity theft; 3) to streamline the resolution 
of the credit and financial difficulties consumers may have when 
they become victims of identity theft; and 4) to enable analysis of 
the extent of, and factors contributing to, identity theft in order to 
enrich policy discussions.269 
1. The identity theft hotline 
First, the FTC established an “identity theft hotline” on November 
1, 1999.270  The hotline, 1-877-ID-THEFT, is based on the success of 
the FTC’s Consumer Response Center, a call center established in 
1997 for general consumer complaints.271  Consumers who report 
identity theft will speak to a counselor who will explain the process of 
resolving credit issues.272 
Counselors tell victims to contact the credit reporting agencies, to 
obtain copies of their credit reports from each agency, and to request 
that a fraud alert be placed on their credit report.273  The counselors 
also encourage the victim to call and write each creditor with whom 
the identity thief has opened an account.274  Counselors are trained to 
explain to victims their rights under the FCRA and the Fair Credit 
Billing Act,275 and they also advise the victims to file a police report.276 
The identity theft hotline has been an important resource for 
consumer victims of identity theft.277  At first, it was receiving 
approximately 445 calls per week.278  By July 2000, the hotline had 
                                                          
 269. March 7, 2000 Hearings, supra note 24, at 34 (statement of Jodie Bernstein, 
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC). 
 270. See July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 9-10 (statement of Jodie Bernstein, 
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (describing how the FTC’s hotline 
assists victims, as well as consumers, with resolving and preventing identity theft). 
 271. See April 22, 1999 Hearings, supra note 22, at 22 (statement of Jodie Bernstein, 
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (explaining that identity theft 
hotline will build on the success of the FTC’s general purpose consumer hotline). 
 272. See July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 9-10 (statement of Jodie Bernstein, 
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (providing details of hotline and 
counselor responsibilities by outlining a victim’s legal rights and responsibilities to 
identify, resolve, and prevent identity theft). 
 273. See id. at 10 (statement of Jodie Bernstein, Director, Bureau of Consumer 
Protection, FTC) (explaining that when a fraud alert appears on a credit report, the 
consumer will be notified every time a credit application is submitted). 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. 
 276. See id. (stating that a police report is the best means of proving identity theft 
to a creditor). 
 277. See generally MARCH 2001 DATA, supra note 32 (summarizing the data collected 
from callers since the hotline was launched). 
 278. Id. 
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received 20,000 calls from potential and actual victims of identity 
theft.279  By March 2001, the hotline was receiving over 2,000 calls per 
week.280 
2. The identity theft clearinghouse 
Second, the FTC implemented the Identity Theft Data 
Clearinghouse (“Clearinghouse”) to satisfy the FTC’s obligation to 
refer victims to appropriate entities.281  The Clearinghouse acts as a 
“comprehensive, government-wide repository of information 
collected from victims of identity theft.”282  Complaints and reports 
from victims are entered into the database when consumers speak to 
a counselor on the hotline.283 
The Clearinghouse is designed to facilitate the communication 
between the FTC and other agencies involved in identity theft.284  For 
example, Clearinghouse information is incorporated into the 
Consumer Sentinel Database, a secure website that forwards FTC 
information to law enforcement agencies.285  Reviewing the 
information collected in the Clearinghouse database gives the FTC 
and law enforcement the means to identify and track patterns of 
identity theft286 and to pinpoint specific practices that facilitate the 
                                                          
 279. July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 9 n.5 (statement of Jodie Bernstein, 
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC). 
 280. MARCH 2001 DATA, supra note 30, at 2. 
 281. See Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, Pub. L. No. 105-318, 
§ 5(a)(3), 112 Stat. 3007, 3010 (1998) (providing that the FTC shall establish 
procedures to refer complaints to three consumer reporting agencies and law 
enforcement). 
 282. March 7, 2000 Hearings, supra note 24, at 35 (statement of Jodie Bernstein, 
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC). 
 283. See MARCH 2001 DATA, supra note 32, at 1 (showing that by March 2001, the 
Clearinghouse had been contacted by and recorded data for 45,593 actual victims of 
identity theft); see also FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, IDENTITY THEFT VICTIM COMPLAINT 
DATA: FIGURES AND TRENDS IN IDENTITY THEFT, NOVEMBER 1999 THROUGH MAY 2001 
Figure 1 (2001) (reporting that by May 2001, the Clearinghouse had recorded almost 
60,000 victims). 
 284. See, e.g., ID Theft:  Links and Publications (listing government agencies involved 
with identity theft, including:  Social Security Administration, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, Department of Justice, and Secret Service), available at 
http://www.consumer.gov/idtheft/info.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2002); see April 22, 
1999 Hearings, supra note 22, at 22 (statement of Jodie Bernstein, Director, Bureau of 
Consumer Protection, FTC) (explaining that Clearinghouse provides a central 
database that enables many agencies “to share and manage data so as to more 
effectively track down identity thieves and assist consumers”). 
 285. See July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 11 (statement of Jodie Bernstein, 
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (stating that in July 2000, law 
enforcement agencies were given access to the Clearinghouse through their desktop 
computers); see also MARCH 2001 DATA, supra note 32, at 1 n.1 (noting that more than 
1,000 law enforcement officers rely on Consumer Sentinel as an investigative 
resource). 
 286. See July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 11 (statement of Jodie Bernstein, 
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crime.287  The FTC is also exploring ways to obtain and share 
information with other agencies, such as the Social Security 
Administration,288 to further ease the burden on victims.289  The FTC, 
however, is hesitant to share the Clearinghouse database information 
with private companies.290  In an effort to control access to the 
personal information contained on the database and to reduce the 
risk of the database itself aiding the identity thieves, the FTC plans to 
limit private companies’ access to the database.291  Instead, the FTC 
will evaluate the data collected and forward only certain information 
to specific private industries involved in an identity theft pattern.292 
3. Consumer education 
Finally, to satisfy its obligation under ITADA, the FTC established a 
consumer education program.293  The FTC began its education efforts 
by coordinating with public and private organizations that had been 
researching identity theft and methods of prevention.294  In February 
2000, the FTC issued a Consumer Alert that explained what 
                                                          
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (stating that “[t]he FTC will 
continue to comb through the data to spot cases for referral, but has also enabled 
others to use the data to ferret out the bad actors.”). 
 287. See March 7, 2000 Hearings, supra note 24, at 35 (statement of Jodie Bernstein, 
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (stating that “we will look at 
whether certain types of transactions or business practices lead to greater 
opportunities for the theft of a person’s personal information or facilitate the misuse 
of that information once obtained.”). 
 288. See id. at 36 (explaining that the database will begin including information 
obtained from the Social Security Administration because social security numbers are 
the means used to steal an identity). 
 289. See April 22, 1999 Hearings, supra note 22, at 22 (statement of Jodie Bernstein, 
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (explaining that a call to one agency 
should simultaneously inform other agencies of identity theft because a victim of 
social security misuse should not have to call all related federal agencies to ensure 
that their complaint was handled by appropriate one). 
 290. See July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 11 (statement of Jodie Bernstein, 
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (claiming that “[t]he Commission 
does not envision providing access to the complete database for these private sector 
entities.”). 
 291. See id. (stating that “[u]nfettered access could interfere with law enforcement 
efforts”). 
 292. See id. (explaining that FTC data analysts will forward complaints to 
companies they find to be engaged in high risk business practices or are not 
responding to consumer complaints). 
 293. See Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, Pub. L. No. 105-318,         
§ 5(a)(2), 112 Stat. 3007, 3010 (1998) (requiring the FTC to establish procedures to 
“provide informational materials to individuals”); see also April 22, 1999 Hearings, 
supra note 22, at 22 (statement of Jodie Bernstein, Director, Bureau of Consumer 
Protection, FTC) (outlining the FTC’s initial plan of consumer education). 
 294. See April 22, 1999 Hearings, supra note 22, at 22 (statement of Jodie Bernstein, 
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (explaining that the FTC is working 
with government and private groups “to develop unified, comprehensive consumer 
education materials for victims of identity theft”). 
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consumers should do if they become victims of identity theft.295  In 
February 2001, the FTC published a booklet, entitled ID Theft: When 
Bad Things Happen to Your Good Name.296  The FTC                             
also educates consumers through its Internet website, 
http://www.consumer.gov/idtheft.297 
B. The FTC Successes 
By outlining the proper steps necessary to prevent additional fraud 
and to begin to clear a credit report, the FTC initiatives have eased 
some of the burden on consumer victims of identity theft caused by 
the credit industry.298  For example, when the FTC began keeping 
data through its identity theft program, only approximately half of 
the victims who contacted the FTC had also informed one of the 
three credit bureaus, and only half had placed fraud alerts on their 
reports.299  Less than half had contacted financial institutions.300  Of 
these, only twelve percent had also sent written notification.301  
Finally, only fifty-three percent had contacted their police 
department.302  The FTC “minimizes the risk of further harm” by 
encouraging victims to complete the process and to contact entities 
that they may not have known were involved, including credit 
bureaus and their local police department.303 
C. The FTC Prevention Efforts 
The FTC also has made significant progress in protecting 
consumer privacy by limiting the credit reporting agencies’ ability to 
                                                          
 295. See FTC Consumer Alert: Identity Crisis—What to Do If Your Identity Is 
Stolen (Feb. 2000) (describing steps for a victim to take to identify, resolve, and 
prevent identity theft), available at http://www.consumer.gov/idtheft (last visited 
Aug. 3, 2002). 
 296. See generally FTC, ID THEFT: WHEN BAD THINGS HAPPEN TO YOUR GOOD NAME 
(2001) (explaining general information on identity theft prevention). 
 297. See July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 10 (statement of Jodie Bernstein, 
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (stating that the website has 
received more than 108,000 hits since it was launched in November 1999). 
 298. See March 7, 2000 Hearings, supra note 24, at 13 (statement of Maureen 
Mitchell, victim) (explaining that information she received from the FTC was 
valuable because there were government bureaus she would not have known to 
notify). 
 299. See MARCH 2001 DATA, supra note 32, at 5 (reporting that only fifty-two 
percent of victims had notified any of the credit bureaus). 
 300. See id. (noting that forty-nine percent of victims had contacted the financial 
institutions involved). 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. 
 303. See id. (reporting that the Hotline counselors explain what steps victims need 
to take to prevent further harm because many victims do not know what to do when 
their identity has been stolen). 
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disclose personal identifying information to third parties.304  In Trans 
Union Corp. v. FTC,305 Trans Union challenged an FTC order that 
defined target marketing lists as “consumer reports,”306 which under 
the FCRA, would be prohibited from being sold for target marketing 
purposes.307  Trans Union’s primary business is to collect information 
on individuals from financial institutions and lenders, compile credit 
reports, and sell the reports to third parties who extend credit.308  
Trans Union receives information from financial institutions in the 
form of “tradelines,” which include a customer’s name, address, 
social security number, account type, credit limit, and payment 
history.309 
In 1987, Trans Union created its second product line, a target 
marketing service,310 which relies on information stored on Trans 
Union’s main database.311  Each person in the target marketing 
database has either two tradelines or one tradeline and a confirmed 
address.312  The target marketing service generates mailing lists based 
on consumer information stored in its database.313  Trans Union sells 
these lists to companies that solicit offers to people in certain 
classes.314  The lists contain only names and addresses, but the 
                                                          
 304. See Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 245 F.3d 809, 811 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (banning 
the sale of target marketing lists because they qualify as “consumer reports,” which 
are prohibited under the FCRA); Individual Reference Servs. Group, Inc. v. FTC, 145 
F. Supp. 2d 6, 13 (D.D.C. 2001), aff’d sub nom. Trans Union LLC v. FTC, 295 F.3d 42 
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that credit header information is subject to privacy 
regulations and the regulations promulgated by the FTC are lawful). 
 305. 245 F.3d 809 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 306. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1) (2000).  FCRA defines consumer report as: 
any written, oral, or other communication of any information by a consumer 
reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, 
credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or 
mode of living which is used or expected to be used or collected in whole or 
in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer’s 
eligibility for credit. . . . 
Id. 
 307. See Trans Union Corp., 245 F.3d at 814-16 (upholding the FTC order banning 
the sale of consumer report lists for target marketing purposes). 
 308. See id. at 812 (explaining that Trans Union receives 1.4 to 1.6 billion records 
per month and their database now contains information on 190 million adults). 
 309. Id. 
 310. See Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 81 F.3d 228, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating that 
Trans Union diversified and created TransMark, now Trans Union Lists). 
 311. See Trans Union Corp., 245 F.3d at 812 (describing that MasterFile, the 
database used for the target marketing service, is a subset of Trans Union’s consumer 
credit database). 
 312. Id. 
 313. See id. (explaining that MasterFile uses information in its consumer credit 
database to compile lists of people who satisfy certain characteristics). 
 314. See Trans Union Corp., 81 F.3d at 229 (explaining that Trans Union uses 
tradelines to generate a base list, from which it creates additional sub-lists, such as 
the “Urban Ethnics” or “EmptyNesters”). 
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purchasers know the characteristics of individuals because Trans 
Union sorts the database according to the characteristics a certain 
solicitor requests.315 
To determine whether target marketing lists were “consumer 
reports” under the FCRA, the D.C. Circuit questioned whether the 
information “is used or expected to be used . . . for the purpose of 
serving as a factor in establishing the consumer’s eligibility for 
credit,” which is the definition of a consumer report.316  Trans Union 
allows marketers to request lists based on credit limits, loan dates, 
number of tradelines, and the existence of tradelines.317  The court 
found that the mere existence of a tradeline is a factor in credit 
granting decisions.318  With this evidence, the court held that the 
tradeline information used in creating target marketing lists satisfied 
the second element of the definition of “consumer report.”319  
Therefore, the sale of target marketing lists was held impermissible 
under the FCRA.320  This decision has a direct bearing on the 
prevention of identity theft.321  With the restriction on target 
marketing, a consumer’s personal information is less accessible, 
decreasing the potential for misuse by identity thieves.322 
More recently, consumer privacy advocates made another 
important stride in their mission to protect disclosure of personal 
information and to prevent identity theft.323  In affirming the district 
court decision in Individual Reference Services Group (“IRSG”) v. FTC,324 
the D.C. Circuit held that all the information a credit reporting 
agency obtains and uses is subject to the new Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
                                                          
 315. See Trans Union Corp., 245 F.3d at 812 (explaining that purchasers of lists 
know that every individual on a list satisfies certain characteristics requested). 
 316. Id. at 813-14 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1) (2000)). 
 317. See id. at 815 (stating that the information in these categories are used in 
prescreening and credit scoring models). 
 318. See id. at 816 (explaining that banks consider the existence of a tradeline as a 
factor in prescreening or credit models). 
 319. See id. at 814 (finding that Trans Union’s list contain information that “is 
used or expected to be used as a factor in establishing credit eligibility”). 
 320. See id. (affirming the FTC’s decision that target marketing lists are protected 
by the FCRA). 
 321. See Ways and Means Hearings, supra note 2, at 121 (statement of Edmund 
Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public Interest Research Group) 
(arguing that the Trans Union decision narrowed the ability for identity thieves to 
obtain information). 
 322. See id. at 121-22 (explaining that disclosing personal information led to 
information broker web sites that gave identity thieves easy access to information). 
 323. See Brian Krebs, Court Decision Deals Another Blow to Credit Data Firms, 
NEWSBYTES NEWS NETWORK, June 29, 2001 (reporting that the credit reporting 
industry will have to comply with new privacy rules), available at 2001 WL 23415895, 
at *1. 
 324.  145 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 2001), aff’d sub nom. Trans Union LLC v. FTC, 295 
F.3d 42 (D.C. Cir. 2002).  
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privacy rules.325  In Trans Union, IRSG and Trans Union challenged 
the inclusion of “credit header” information in the privacy 
regulations implemented under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLB 
Act”).326  Trans Union credit reports contain both identifying 
information and tradeline information obtained from financial 
institutions.327  The identifying information, called the “credit 
header,” consists of a person’s name, address, social security number, 
and phone number.328  Trans Union receives “credit header” 
information and sells it to businesses that use the information to 
detect fraud, enforce child support orders, and to locate individuals 
involved in financial crimes.329 
Before the D.C. Circuit’s ruling, “credit header” information was 
not considered a consumer report and was not subject to the FCRA.330  
As a result, “credit header” information could be sold to third parties 
for any purpose.331  Despite arguments that the “credit header” does 
not have a direct bearing on creditworthiness, the misappropriation 
of the basic personal information that is contained in the credit 
header caused the identity theft of Adelaide Andrews and many 
                                                          
 325. Trans Union LLC, 295 F.3d at 48-50; see also Financial Services Modernization 
Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 6801(2000)); 16 C.F.R. §§313.10-313.12 (2000) (mandating new privacy 
rules that limit the disclosure of nonpublic personal information by financial 
institutions, require financial institutions to give notice of their privacy policies, 
define conditions under which a third party can receive nonpublic personal 
information, and allow consumers to opt-out of sharing personal data kept by 
financial institutions). 
 326. See Trans Union LLC, 295 F.3d at 46 (arguing that the privacy regulations are 
unconstitutional and unlawful).   
 327. See Individual Reference Servs. Group, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 14. 
 328. Id. at 17; see also Privacy Update:  Exam Guidelines, Anti-Spam Bill, Credit Headers, 
ID Theft, CBA REPORTS, June 1, 2001 (explaining that credit headers are based on 
credit reports but are stripped of financial content and distributed separately from 
credit reports), available at 2001 WL 11962810, at *2 . 
 329. See Individual Reference Servs. Group, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 14 (describing three 
Trans Union products that sell credit header data: Trace, ReTrace, and ID Search); 
see also Edmund Sanders, Curb on Sale of Consumer Data Upheld, L.A. TIMES, May 8, 
2001, at C1 (quoting a Trans Union spokesman’s statement that the court’s decision 
will negatively affect the beneficial uses for selling “credit header” information, such 
as finding fugitives, runaways, and parents that owe child support). 
 330. See Individual Reference Servs. Group, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 17 (explaining that the 
FTC and the credit reporting agencies agree that “credit header” information was 
not protected by the FCRA). 
 331. See id. (explaining that “credit header” information was not subject to the 
FCRA because it was not thought to bear on credit worthiness); see also 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1681b (2000) (prohibiting disclosure of information that is considered a consumer 
report, unless it is for a permissible purpose); Ways and Means Hearings, supra note 2, 
at 121 (statement of Edmund Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public 
Interest Research Group) (arguing that the credit header loophole “allowed credit 
bureaus to separate a consumer’s so-called header or identifying information from 
the balance of an otherwise strictly regulated credit report and sell it to anyone for 
any purpose”). 
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others.332 
The GLB Act,333 passed in November 1999, was intended to 
increase competition among firms in the financial services industry.334  
Because this increase in competition would lead to increased 
accessibility of personal information, the GLB Act required agencies 
to promulgate rules describing the conditions under which financial 
institutions could disclose “nonpublic personal information” to third 
parties.335  The GLB Act defined “nonpublic personal information” as 
“personally identifiable financial information.”336  The FTC final rule 
further defined “personally identifiable financial information” as “any 
information a consumer provides to a financial institution to obtain a 
financial product or service.”337  According to the FTC, “credit 
header” information would be included in this definition because it is 
given to a credit reporting agency, which the FTC considered to be a 
financial institution.338  Therefore, disclosure of “credit header” 
information would be subject to the same strict privacy rules as 
information obtained by other financial institutions.339 
First, Trans Union asserted it was not a “financial institution” under 
the GLB Act.340  Since the credit reporting services are “closely related 
to banking or managing or controlling banks,” the court held that 
the credit reporting agencies were “financial institutions” and the 
                                                          
 332. See Ways and Means Hearings, supra note 2, at 122-24 (statement of Edmund 
Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public Interest Research Group) 
(stating that the availability of the social security number in credit header 
information has aided identity thieves and stalkers). 
 333. Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 
1338 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2000)).  
 334. See Trans Union LLC, 295 F.3d at 46 (describing the purpose of the GLB Act); 
Individual Reference Servs. Group, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 17-18 (explaining that the purpose 
of the GLB Act is to provide a framework for financial services providers that will 
increase product availability to allow domestic providers to compete globally). 
 335. See Individual Reference Servs. Group, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 17-18 (describing that 
the Act balances consumer’s need for privacy and the desire to increase competition 
within the financial sector); see also 15 U.S.C. § 6802(a)-(b) (requiring financial 
institutions to give notice of privacy policies and allow a consumer to opt-out of 
disclosing their information). 
 336. 15 U.S.C. § 6809(4)(A) (2002). 
 337. 16 C.F.R. § 313.3(o)(1).  See also Individual Reference Servs. Group, 145 F. Supp. 
2d at 26 (explaining that the regulations fill the gap in the term’s definition). 
 338. See Trans Union LLC, 295 F.3d at 51 (holding that a credit reporting agency is 
a “financial institution” and explaining that the FTC’s interpretation of 15 U.S.C.      
§ 6809(4)(A) includes any information provided by a customer to a financial 
institution). 
 339. See Individual Reference Servs. Group, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 26 (arguing that “credit 
header information is improperly subsumed within the ambit of the GLB Act.”). 
 340.  See id. at 32; Trans Union LLC, 295 F.3d at 48 (arguing that the FTC had no 
authority over credit reporting agencies because they should not be considered 
“financial institutions” under the GLB Act).  
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FTC clearly had rulemaking authority over them.341  Second, the 
consumer reporting agencies claimed the FTC’s definition of 
“personally identifiable financial information” as “any information 
provided to [a financial institution] to obtain a financial service or 
product” conflicted with the plain language of the GLB Act.342  They 
argued that information in a “credit header” is not considered 
“financial” according to the dictionary definition of that term.343  
Therefore, the FTC definition eliminates the “financial” component 
of “personally identifiable financial information” as defined in the 
statute.344  
To determine whether the FTC definition was a reasonable 
interpretation of the statute, the court applied the two part test 
outlined in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc.345  Under Chevron, the court examines whether Congress expressly 
addressed the question at issue.346  The court is bound to give effect to 
congressional intent if it is clear from the statute or the legislative 
history.347 However, if the statute is silent or the congressional intent 
is ambiguous, the court considers whether the agency’s interpretation 
is a permissible construction of the statute.348  According to Chevron, 
the court will give deference to a reasonable agency interpretation of 
an ambiguous statutory provision.349   
Applying the Chevron test, the district court examined the language 
of the GLB Act, additional provisions of the GLB Act, and the 
legislative history.350  The district court found that “nonpublic 
personal information” was meant to encompass a large list of 
information, based on the context in which it was received, “rather 
than the intrinsic nature of the information itself.”351  Although the 
                                                          
 341.  See Trans Union LLC, 295 F.3d at 48-9 (finding that a credit reporting agency 
fit the GLB Act’s definition of “financial institution”).  
 342. See id. at 51 (claiming that if the plain meaning of the statute were applied, 
only information related to a consumer’s financial condition would be subject to the 
privacy rules); see also 16 C.F.R. § 313.3(o)(1)(i)-(iii) (defining “personal identifiable 
financial information”).   
 343.  See Individual Reference Servs. Group, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 26-7 (citing the 
dictionary definition of “financial” and arguing that credit header information 
should be removed from the GLB Act privacy rules because it is not “financial” 
information).    
 344.  Id.  
 345. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984); Trans Union LLC, 295 F.3d at 51. 
 346. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
 347.  Id.  
 348. Id. 
 349.  Id.  
 350. See Individual Reference Servs. Group, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 26-29 (applying tools of 
statutory construction to the GLB Act to determine the definition of personally 
identifiable financial information). 
 351. Id. at 27. 
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legislative history suggested this included “credit header” data,352 the 
district court characterized the definition as ambiguous.353  Because 
the definition of “personal identifiable financial information” was 
ambiguous, the court would give deference to the agency’s definition, 
if it were reasonable.354 The court held that the FTC had justified its 
inclusion of “credit header” information in its definition of 
nonpublic personal information when the FTC stated: 
financial institutions rely on a broad range of information that they 
obtain about consumers, including information such as addresses 
and telephone numbers. . . .  [I]t would be inappropriate to carve 
out certain items of information that a particular financial 
institution might rely on when providing a financial product or 
service.355 
The district court concluded that the FTC’s interpretation was a 
reasonable construction of the statute; therefore, the inclusion of the 
“credit header” information in the GLB privacy regulations was 
justified.356  The D.C. Circuit affirmed, emphasizing that the FTC’s 
definition of “personally identifiable financial information” was 
consistent with the broad definition of “financial institution” in the 
GLB Act.357 
As a result of this decision, credit reporting agencies are unable to 
share “credit header” information because they do not give their 
customers notice of their sharing policies with respect to “credit 
header” information, or notice of the right to opt out of sharing.358  
Adelaide Andrews’ case illustrates that only basic information, like 
                                                          
 352. See id. at 29 (reviewing congressional debates in which two members of 
Congress expressly included “credit header” information in the definition of 
personal financial information). 
 353. See id. (stating that “[t]his inclusion of credit header information within the 
meaning of ‘financial information’ during debates in both Houses of Congress 
reinforces the finding that the statute cannot be interpreted as argued by plaintiffs 
would like, but more fairly should be characterized as ambiguous with respect to that 
term.”). 
 354. See id. at 31 (explaining that under circumstances where Congress’ actions 
are ambiguous and where an agency shows its regulations were carefully and 
reasonably drafted, the court must defer to the agency’s interpretation of the 
statute). 
 355. Id. 
 356. See id. at 46 (finding that the regulations drafted by the FTC were lawful and 
do not breach the plain meaning of the GLB Act or constitute an improper 
construction of the statute). 
 357.  See Trans Union LLC, 295 F.3d at 51 (reasoning that subjecting “credit 
header” information to the privacy rules would be consistent with the Act’s definition 
of “financial institution,” which encompasses activities that are not traditionally 
considered “financial”).   
 358. See Ways and Means Hearings, supra note 2, at 121 (statement of Edmund 
Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public Interest Research Group) 
(explaining that the decision will prevent identity theft, at least temporarily). 
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that included in a “credit header,” is needed to steal an identity.359  
With this decision, cases like Adelaide Andrews’ could be less 
frequent because the disclosure of one’s basic information would be 
restricted.360 
These cases demonstrate the FTC’s commitment to preventing 
identity theft and protecting consumers from unwanted disclosure of 
their personal information.361  The effect of the decision, however, is 
limited because credit reporting agencies could obtain the personal 
information from other institutions that are not regulated by the 
GLB Rules.362  In addition, the “credit header” information is only 
protected until the financial institutions amend their privacy policies 
to provide notice of the possibility their information will be shared.363  
Finally, the restriction on disclosure of information does nothing to 
assist consumers who have already had their identities stolen and are 
burdened with the task of reestablishing their reputation.364 
V. POSSIBLE AGENCY AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 
A. Voluntary Initiatives 
Victims of identity theft suggest that a uniform protocol of 
procedures would significantly alleviate the burden of restoring their 
names, reputations, and credit histories.365  The FTC can use the tools 
                                                          
 359. See generally TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001) (illustrating that a 
name and social security number are sufficient to successfully steal a victim’s 
identity). 
 360. See Ways and Means Hearings, supra note 2, at 121 (statement of Edmund 
Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public Interest Research Group) 
(explaining that the decision helps prevent identity theft, but the credit header 
loophole should also be closed by statute). 
 361. See id. (describing the two cases involving the FTC as “a strong victory for 
privacy protection”). 
 362. See Millett, supra note 242, at 13 (explaining that credit reporting agencies 
can still sell the same information, but they must obtain it from other sources). 
 363. See Ways and Means Hearings, supra note 2, at 121 (statement of Edmund 
Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public Interest Research Group) 
(stating that credit header data will only be protected until the financial institutions 
amend their privacy policies to give notice that it will be shared and then only those 
consumers that opt-out of sharing the information will be protected). 
 364. See Morphy, supra note 17 (describing the many obstacles an identity theft 
victim faces, such as the statute of limitations and the substantial length of time 
required to clear an erroneous credit report); see also Millett, supra note 242, at 12 
(explaining that the procedure to clear a fraudulent credit history is “like a tennis 
match”). 
 365. See March 7, 2000 Hearings, supra note 24, at 21 (statement of Maureen 
Mitchell, victim) (recommending a “standardized, universally accepted national 
protocol for victims of Identity Theft to follow.  The bona fide victim should have to 
fill out one set of documents containing a notarized affidavit, a police report, a 
notarized handwriting sample . . . to be able to submit copies to each merchant.”). 
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it has established to develop procedures to relieve some of the 
burdens that the credit industry created.366  Specifically, the FTC 
referral service and its authority over identity theft issues can help 
streamline the procedures victims of identity theft must endure to 
regain financial health and rebuild their reputations.367 
The FTC has debated two voluntary initiatives to facilitate a victim’s 
process of rebuilding his credit and reputation.368  First, the FTC 
drafted and recently published a uniform fraud declaration that all 
credit bureaus and all creditors would accept.369  This standardized 
declaration form reduces the burden on the victims because they are 
no longer required to fill out multiple forms with the same 
information.370  Standardizing the fraud notification process, 
however, raises a legitimate concern that the declaration could lead 
to more identity theft if it fell into a criminal’s hands.371 
Second, the FTC proposed the “one stop fraud alert” to streamline 
the fraud alert notification process.372  The “one stop fraud alert” 
would allow the consumer to call one number to have a fraud alert 
placed on their credit report at all of the three credit bureaus, 
                                                          
 366. See IDENTITY THEFT WORKSHOP, supra note 36, at 181 (remarks of Betsy 
Broder, Assistant Director, Division of Planning and Information, FTC) (explaining a 
legislative proposal where the FTC would take on the obligation of creating model 
protocols, if credit reporting agencies were unsuccessful). 
 367. See March 7, 2000 Hearings, supra note 24, at 38 (statement of Jodie Bernstein, 
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (explaining the FTC is looking at 
ways to streamline the remediation process and citing the benefit to consumers of 
making a single phone call to have a fraud alert placed on all three credit reports, 
with a copy then mailed to their home). 
 368. See generally IDENTITY THEFT WORKSHOP, supra note 36 (discussing the “model 
fraud affidavit” and the “one stop fraud alert”); see also FTC, IDENTITY THEFT 
WORKSHOP: ONE STOP SHOP BREAKOUT SESSION 13 (Oct. 24, 2000) [hereinafter 
BREAKOUT SESSION] (remarks of Helen Foster, Attorney, Division of Planning and 
Information, FTC) (explaining FTC proposals are voluntary initiatives and not 
mandated by ITADA). 
 369. ID THEFT AFFIDAVIT, at http://www.consumer.gov/idtheft/affidavit.htm (last 
visited Aug. 4, 2002); see March 7, 2000 Hearings, supra note 24, at 47 (statement of 
Jodie Bernstein, Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (responding to 
question from Sen. Dianne Feinstein, that “a standardized form is just one measure 
that would relieve the burden on identity theft victims”). 
 370. See 147 CONG. REC. S9079 (daily ed. Sept. 4, 2001) (statement of Sen. Dianne 
Feinstein) (explaining that the new model form, which will be accepted by the three 
credit bureaus and many major financial institutions, will substantially decrease the 
paperwork burden on victims). 
 371. See IDENTITY THEFT WORKSHOP, supra note 36, at 249 (remarks of Steve 
Munson, Deputy Attorney General, State of New Jersey, Division of Criminal Justice) 
(proffering that a uniform fraud affidavit must be accompanied by a confidentiality 
guarantee if it is to be prevented from falling into the wrong hands). 
 372. See March 7, 2000 Hearings, supra note 24, at 47 (statement of Jodie Bernstein, 
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (explaining another way to 
streamline processes would be to reduce number of phone calls a victim had to 
make). 
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reducing the number of phone calls a victim must make.373  The 
Associated Credit Bureaus, the trade association that represents the 
credit reporting agencies, has opposed the “one stop fraud alert,” 
claiming it will create problems with the consumer’s right, under the 
FCRA, to dispute records on credit reports.374  Credit bureaus fear 
liability from consumers who are not made aware that the “one stop 
call” is only a first step.375 
Nevertheless, victims agree that the ability to make a single phone 
call—rather than several—would alleviate some of their burden.376  
The FTC, rather than the credit reporting agencies, is the 
appropriate entity to establish a “one call” service.377  While the FTC 
does not have access to the credit reporting agencies’ databases,378 the 
tools it has established, such as the Hotline and the role it was given 
as a referral service, make it the most logical agency to establish the 
“one stop fraud alert” outside of the fraud dispute process.379 
The credit reporting agencies have attempted to address the 
burden on identity theft victims through a series of voluntary 
initiatives.380  In 1997, the agencies formed the Individual Reference 
                                                          
 373. BREAKOUT SESSION, supra note 368, at 4-5 (remarks of Helen Foster, Attorney, 
Division of Planning and Information, FTC). 
 374. The Associated Credit Bureau has changed its name to Consumer Data 
Industry Association.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1681i (2000) (explaining the dispute resolution 
process for records on credit reports); see also IDENTITY THEFT WORKSHOP, supra note 
36, at 160-61 (remarks of Stuart Pratt, Vice President of Government Relations, 
Associates Credit Bureaus, Inc.) (stating that “you have begun triggering a series of 
duties we have under the law” and explaining how a “one stop fraud alert” outside of 
the dispute resolution process may be misleading for consumers who may think 
calling a single number will act as the dispute resolution process required under the 
FCRA). 
 375. See BREAKOUT SESSION, supra note 368, at 1 (remarks of Helen Foster, 
Attorney, Division of Planning and Information, FTC) (explaining that “one stop 
shop” terminology is misleading and FTC envisions a two step process where a fraud 
alert first is placed, and second, the credit reporting agencies are contacted); id. at 
14 (remarks of Janine Benner, Consumer Associate, California Public Interest 
Research Group (“CALPIRG”)) (explaining that it should not be portrayed as a 
single number that will solve all identity theft problems). 
 376. See id. at 15 (remarks of Janine Benner, Consumer Associate, CALPIRG) 
(stating that one call would give “reassurance . . . that you do have the fraud alert on 
there before you start going through the other tasks”). 
 377. See IDENTITY THEFT WORKSHOP, supra note 36, at 103 (remarks of Helen 
Foster, Attorney, Division of Planning and Information, FTC) (explaining that 
because credit reporting agencies are competitors, they cannot share information in 
the same way as noncompetitors). 
 378. See BREAKOUT SESSION, supra note 368, at 21 (remarks of Phil McKee, Assistant 
Director, Internet Fraud Watch) (arguing that only way to make an outside phone 
number work is if the agency had access to credit reporting agencies’ databases, 
which is not currently possible). 
 379. See id. at 15 (remarks of Janine Benner, Consumer Associate, CALPIRG) 
(stating that the FTC can act as a facilitator in the process of contacting creditors and 
credit reporting agencies). 
 380. See July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 73-75 (statement of Stuart Pratt, 
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Services Group, which instituted self-regulatory principles for the 
credit industry.381  Associated Credit Bureaus announced their own 
voluntary initiatives in March 2000.382  Each credit reporting agency 
has also addressed identity theft in some way.383  These voluntary 
initiatives, however, have been unsuccessful, as social security 
numbers and personal information are still being obtained by 
thieves.384 
B. Legislative Proposals 
On October 4, 2001, Timothy Muris, the new Chairman of the 
FTC, announced that he would not pursue new privacy legislation.385  
Instead, he intends to increase the enforcement of existing privacy 
                                                          
Vice President of Government Relations, Associates Credit Bureaus, Inc.) (describing 
the ACB efforts to address fraud, including the creation of the Fraud and Security 
Task Force, fraud units, and enhanced customer service programs). 
 381. See id. at 65 (statement of Steven Emmert, Director of Government and 
Industry Affairs, Reed Elsevier Inc.) (describing that companies in the IRSG commit 
to restricting distribution of non-public information, educating the public about 
their databases, and acquiring non-public information from reputable sources). 
 382. See Press Release, Associated Credit Bureaus, Credit Reporting Industry 
Announces Identity Theft Initiatives (Mar. 14, 2000)(outlining six point program to 
improve identity theft assistance), available at http://www.acb-credit.com/qspage. 
cfm?PageID=116 (last visited July 10, 2001); see also Rich, supra note 180, at A9 
(explaining the credit bureaus’ voluntary initiatives and their opposition to reform). 
 383. See , e.g., Press Release, Trans Union, From Hollywood to Main Street: Trans 
Union Helps Victims, Law Enforcement Ward Off Credit Fraud (June 18, 2001) 
(discussing Trans Union’s Fraud Victim Assistance Department), available at 
http://www.transunion.com/Press/PressReleaseDetails.jsp?id=/releases/press 
/data/2001061808331300.xml&page=4 (last visited Aug. 4, 2002); Equifax Consumer 
Services (advertising Credit Watch, which allows a consumer to have Equifax monitor 
your credit report for a fee), available at http://www.econsumer.equifax.com (last 
visited Aug. 4, 2002).  See generally EXPERIAN, AN EXPERIAN WHITE PAPER:  LIFTING THE 
LID OFF IDENTITY THEFT AND TRANSACTION FRAUD 8 (2002) (discussing Experian’s 
products that detect fraud). 
 384. See Rich, supra note 180, at A9 (reporting that FTC supported new legislation 
because the self regulatory approach was inadequate and resulted in few changes); 
see also Ways and Means Hearings, supra note 2, at 122 (statement of Edmund 
Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public Interest Research Group) 
(explaining that IRSG initiatives to restrict access to social security numbers were 
unsuccessful because social security numbers can still be purchased on websites). 
 385. See Timothy Muris, Remarks at The Privacy 2001 Conference (Oct. 4, 2001) 
(stating that “[a]t this time, we need more law enforcement, not new laws.”), available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/privisp1002. htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2002); 
Erika Morphy, FTC Shifts Internet Privacy Stance, ECOMMERCETIMES, Oct. 5, 2001 
(noting that the FTC’s new position on privacy is a reversal of the FTC position on 
privacy under the Clinton Administration), available at http://www. 
ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/13969.html (last visited July 23, 2002); see also K. 
Daniel Glover, Which Way Internet Privacy?, FIN. EXECUTIVE, July/Aug. 2001, at 24 
(“[P]rivacy lacks a ‘champion’ in either the Bush administration or Congress.”); 
Jonathan Krim, FTC Will Not Seek New Privacy Laws, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2001, at E11 
(reporting that opponents believe that the new policy ignores five years of studies 
that show new legislation is necessary). 
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laws.386  However, aggressive legislative action requiring the credit 
industry to establish more efficient procedures for victims of identity 
theft, and creating an incentive to follow those procedures, is 
essential to make a real impact on a victim’s remediation process.387  
The FTC’s voluntary initiatives, while alleviating some of the burden 
on a victim of identity theft, do not hold the credit industry 
accountable for its role in the identity theft problem.388 
1. Legislation to hold the credit industry accountable 
Most of the pending legislation to prevent identity theft limits the 
display of the social security number.389  Other pieces of legislation 
call for the credit header loophole to be closed by statute.390  While 
prevention is vital, legislation should also impose an obligation on 
the credit industry to establish procedures that facilitate the process 
of restoring a victim’s credit history and penalize the industry for 
failing to do so.391 
In 2000, Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal) introduced the Identity 
Theft Prevention Act of 2000392 as an attempt to empower victims by 
addressing the shortcomings of the credit industry and implementing 
measures to help victims recover.393  The bill restricted the 
                                                          
 386. See Morphy, supra note 385 (reporting that the FTC plans to increase its 
enforcement budget by fifty percent). 
 387. See July 12, 2000 Hearings, supra note 20, at 35 (statement of Beth Givens, 
Director, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse) (explaining that laws are needed to create 
incentives for the credit industry to change how it operates). 
 388. See March 7, 2000 Hearings, supra note 24, at 38 (statement of Jodie Bernstein, 
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC) (discussing state legislation that is 
aimed at directly assisting victims); 146 CONG. REC. E587 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 2000) 
(statement of Hon. Darlene Hooley) (advocating for legislation that would impose 
fines on creditors for not following procedures to protect privacy). 
 389. See, e.g., Social Security Number Misuse Prevention Act, S. 848, 107th Cong. 
(2001) (prohibiting the sale of a social security number without holder’s consent); 
Identity Theft Protection Act, H.R. 220, 107th Cong. (2001) (prohibiting federal or 
local agencies from requesting or requiring disclosure of social security numbers or 
mandating a national identification number). 
 390. See, e.g., Social Security Number Privacy and The Identity Theft Prevention 
Act of 2001, H.R. 2036, S. 1014, 107th Cong. (2001) (restricting sale of social security 
numbers and subjecting the credit header information to the FCRA); Personal 
Information Privacy Act of 2001, H.R. 1478, 107th Cong. (2001) (redefining 
“consumer report” in the FCRA to exclude identifying information in a local 
telephone book so as to ensure credit header information is kept confidential); see 
also Ways and Means Hearings, supra note 2, at 118 (statement of Edmund 
Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public Interest Research Group) 
(advocating that legislation close the credit header loophole). 
 391. See, e.g., The Identity Theft Prevention Act of 2000, H.R. 4311, 106th Cong. 
(2000) (codifying the fraud alert process and imposing fines on the credit industry 
for not recognizing fraud alerts). 
 392. Identity Theft Prevention Act of 2000, S. 2328, 106th Cong. (2000). 
 393. See 146 CONG. REC. S1987 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 2000) (statement of Sen. Dianne 
Feinstein) (seeking to empower victims because they are often treated like 
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distribution of identifying information, thereby addressing the plight 
of an identity theft victim.394  It also required credit reporting 
agencies to investigate discrepancies in a person’s account395 and to 
notify all creditors of a change of address to alert them of possible 
suspicious activity.396  Most significantly, Senate Bill 2328 also 
increased the FTC’s authority, allowing the agency to impose fines on 
creditors that ignore a fraud alert.397  Finally, the bill called on the 
credit industry to develop model forms and procedures to be used by 
consumers to inform the credit industry of identity fraud.398 
In 2001, Senator Feinstein introduced a similar bill, the Identity 
Theft Prevention Act of 2001,399 which prevents identity theft and 
assists victims in restoring their reputations.400  This bill recognizes the 
inadequacies of the current system for identity theft victims and 
endorses the uniform reporting protocol debated by the FTC.401  It 
also requires credit card machines to truncate credit card numbers 
and to notify consumers when an additional credit card is requested 
on an existing account.402  The bill requires credit bureaus to notify 
                                                          
criminals). 
 394. See id. (explaining that S. 2328 closes a loophole in FCRA that allows personal 
identifying information to be marketed and only sold by allowing disclosure for 
permissible purposes). 
 395. See S. 2328 § 5 (directing the FTC to devise regulations requiring consumer 
reporting agencies to investigate discrepancies between the information a consumer 
provides and the information already on file). 
 396. See id. § 3 (requiring credit reporting agencies to submit notification of fraud 
when a new address is used on an application for credit); see also 146 CONG. REC. 
S1987 (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein) (explaining that the bill improves how 
credit card companies monitor requests for new cards and changes of address 
because this would alert consumers of potential fraud). 
 397. See S. 2328 § 4 (requiring creditors to comply with fraud alert procedures); see 
also 146 CONG. REC. S1987 (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein) (discussing that the 
bill would give the FTC authority to impose fines on creditors that ignore a fraud 
alert). 
 398. See S. 2328 § 10 (directing FTC to establish model forms and standard 
procedures, which will assist aggrieved consumers in reporting incidents of identity 
theft); see also 146 CONG. REC. S1987 (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein) 
(explaining that if the credit industry fails to implement measures to assist victims in 
notifying creditors of fraud, the FTC can take action). 
 399. S. 1399, 107th Cong. (2001). 
 400. See 147 CONG. REC. S9078 (daily ed. Sept. 4, 2001) (statement of Sen. Dianne 
Feinstein) (introducing simple, practical proposals to help victims restore their 
financial reputations, and including provisions to make identity theft more difficult). 
 401. S. 1399 § 2(9)-(10).  The Bill states that: 
(9) [T]he resources available to identity theft victims are inadequate and 
both private sector and federal agencies should provide better and more 
sympathetic assistance to such victims; and (10) credit reporting agencies 
and issuers of credit should have uniform reporting requirements and 
effective fraud alerts to assist identity theft victims in repairing and 
protecting their credit. 
Id. 
 402. See id. § 4 (providing that no person shall print more than the last five digits 
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creditors of discrepancies between the applicant’s address and the 
address filed with the reporting agency.403  In addition, to assist 
victims, the bill codifies the fraud alert process.404  Senate Bill 1399 
requires a credit reporting agency to include a fraud alert upon a 
customer’s request and to notify creditors of the fraud.405  Most 
importantly, creditors that fail to comply with a fraud alert will be 
penalized,406 and the FTC is authorized to impose fines against 
creditors who ignore a fraud alert.407 
More recently, the Restore Your Identity Act of 2001,408 introduced 
in the Senate, also recognized the difficulties victims encounter and 
the responsibility the credit reporting agencies have in mitigating the 
harm that identity theft causes.409  This bill alleviates the burdens 
victims face with creditors by requiring a business entity that possesses 
information on an identity theft to disclose that information within 
ten days of a request from the victim.410  This provision provides an 
incentive for creditors to respond quickly to victims, reduces the time 
that it takes a victim to ascertain what has transpired, and prevents 
further harm.411  The bill also recognizes the standardized fraud 
affidavit as a legitimate piece of identification.412  Finally, the bill 
amends the FCRA to include a provision to block information that 
results from an identity theft, which would prevent further 
victimization by collection agencies.413  Both Senate Bills 1399 and 
1742 are important bills because they include measures to prevent 
                                                          
of a credit card number on any receipt); see also 147 CONG. REC. S9078 (statement of 
Sen. Dianne Feinstein) (explaining that truncating credit card numbers would 
prevent identity thieves from gaining information and account numbers from 
discarded receipts). 
 403. See S. 1399 § 3(b) (mandating a card issuer to notify a cardholder at both new 
and old address when an additional card is ordered and a change of address is 
submitted). 
 404. See id. (requiring credit reporting agencies to use fraud alerts and imposing 
penalties for not complying). 
 405. S. 1399 § 3(h)(1)-(2). 
 406. Id. § 3(h)(3). 
 407. 147 CONG. REC. S9078 (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein). 
 408. S. 1742, 107th Cong. (2001). 
 409. See S. 1742 § 2(6)-(9) (describing the harm victims face and the responsibility 
of the credit reporting agencies in assisting victims to clear the fraudulent reports 
and rebuild their credit). 
 410. Id. § 5(a)(1). 
 411. See, e.g., Ways and Means Hearings, supra note 2, at 14 (statement of Emeke 
Moneme, victim) (discussing the numerous difficulties she encountered in 
contacting creditors in a timely fashion, and stating that by the time she had 
completed contacting all the credit reporting agencies, a total of $30,000 in credit 
had been used). 
 412. See S. 1742 § 5(c) (allowing the victim to provide the business entity with a 
police report and standardized fraud affidavit as proof of a fraud victim). 
 413. See id. § 6(e) (requiring that a credit reporting agency block information 
identified by the victim so that it cannot be reported). 
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identity theft and address the burdens victims face by including 
provisions to combat the “endless cycle of victimization” caused by 
the credit industry.414 
2. Legislation to amend the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
The legislative proposals that would have the most significant 
impact on victims of identity theft would amend the FCRA to 
incorporate an injury discovery rule.415  As Justice Scalia stated in his 
concurrence in the TRW decision, “[t]hese cries, however, are 
properly directed not to us, but to Congress, whose job it is to decide 
how ‘humane’ legislation should be.”416  Even if their statutory 
construction argument is correct, the Supreme Court’s conclusion 
that the FCRA does not cover an area of the law that “cries out” for 
an application of the injury discovery rule ignores the prevalence of 
identity theft and the degree of harm it can cause.417   
Significantly, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) recently introduced a 
bill that would make the FCRA more “humane.”418  The adoption of 
an injury discovery rule, proposed in Leahy’s legislation and the 
corresponding House bill, would serve important public policy goals 
and reinforce the FCRA’s initial purpose to maintain accuracy of 
credit reports.419  First, applying an injury discovery rule to the FCRA 
would provide an incentive for credit reporting agencies to keep 
accurate data and to help stop identity thieves.420  By refusing to 
                                                          
 414. See 147 CONG. REC. S9078 (daily ed. Sept. 4, 2001) (statement of Sen. Dianne 
Feinstein) (describing that S. 1399 helps victims restore their credit histories quickly 
and makes it easier to report fraud). 
 415. See Borrowers Beware, supra note 44, at 6 (reporting that Congress should 
reconsider the needs of the identity theft victim and extend the discovery rule to 
cover more than suits that allege damages from misrepresentation of an FCRA 
violation). 
 416. TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 38 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 417. See Borrowers Beware, supra note 44, at 6 (urging Congress to “reconsider the 
balance between the needs of victims of identity theft and the need for repose by the 
credit reporting agencies”). 
 418. See Protect Victims of Identity Theft Act of 2001, S. 1723, H.R. 3368, 107th 
Cong. (2001) (introducing a bill to amend the FCRA to provide that an action can 
be brought for damages not later than two years after the date on which the violation 
is discovered or should have been discovered through reasonable diligence); see also 
147 CONG. REC. S12,006 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2001) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) 
(stating that adopting the discovery rule in the FCRA “ensures that consumers have a 
fair chance to vindicate their rights”). 
 419. See Editorial On Credit, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Nov. 14, 2001, at 8B (outlining the 
need for incentives for the credit industry and noting that without the protection of 
the short two year statute of limitation, the credit reporting agencies themselves 
would be more likely to actively ensure the accuracy of their data). 
 420. See id. (reporting that the Supreme Court decision removes the incentive for 
credit reporting agencies to implement effective safeguards); see also 147 CONG. REC. 
S12,006 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (stating that S. 1723 would give the FCRA 
“real teeth to fulfill its mission of protecting the accuracy and privacy of consumer 
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extend an injury discovery rule beyond cases in which there is 
misrepresentation, the Supreme Court has enabled the credit 
reporting agencies to avoid liability for many claims.421  If the statute 
were extended and the discovery rule applied, credit reporting 
agencies would be exposed to more liability and would maintain 
consumer records more carefully.422 
TRW argued, however, that this exposure to liability would increase 
the “risk of litigating stale claims.”423  The discovery rule, according to 
TRW, would “upset the balance” between the public’s interest in 
protecting claims and the defendant’s interest in finding repose.424  
TRW argued that the increased exposure to liability would create 
uncertainty for credit reporting agencies and would increase the cost 
of doing business by requiring the credit reporting agencies to retain 
files for a longer period of time.425  Allowing defendants to 
contemplate a timeframe for liability is certainly a legitimate 
objective; however, TRW’s arguments in support of more timely 
repose are inadequate.426  To support this assertion, TRW again relied 
on the notice and access provisions of the FCRA to prove that 
existing statutory provisions already adequately protect valid claims.427  
However, as explained above, these provisions are insufficient to 
protect valid claims.428  In addition, considering the technology that is 
available to store massive amounts of data, the increase in the cost of 
doing business would be less severe than the credit industry 
                                                          
credit information”). 
 421. See 147 CONG. REC. S12,006 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (explaining 
that the statute of limitations could expire before a consumer suspects that their 
information has fallen into a criminal’s hands, thereby benefiting the credit 
reporting agencies). 
 422. See Editorial On Credit, supra note 419, at 8B (explaining that a longer statute 
of limitations would encourage credit reporting agencies to actively monitor the 
accuracy of the reports they compile); see also 147 CONG. REC. S12,006 (statement of 
Sen. Patrick Leahy) (stating that the legislation would encourage credit bureaus to 
establish procedures to prevent identity theft). 
 423. Petitioner’s Brief at 30, TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001) (No. 00-
1045). 
 424. See id. (stating that “application of the discovery rule tips the balance struck 
by a statute of limitations in favor of protecting claims and against repose”). 
 425. See id. at 28-30 (stating that the industry maintains files on nearly 200 million 
consumers and since they are updated monthly, the burden on credit reporting 
agencies would be significant). 
 426. See Respondent’s Brief at 40-47, TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001) 
(No. 00-1045) (undercutting TRW’s arguments and arguing that TRW overstates the 
consumer benefits of the FCRA “notice” and “access” provisions). 
 427. See Petitioner’s Brief at 31, TRW (No. 00-1045) (arguing that the FCRA 
requires consumers to be notified of any adverse action taken against them). 
 428. See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text (describing the inadequacies of 
the notice and access provisions). 
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anticipates.429 
Second, an injury discovery rule would provide a mechanism for 
monitoring the credit reporting agencies.430  With the statute of 
limitations beginning at the time of the violation, there is virtually no 
monitor over the industry.431  Although the FTC has authority to 
enforce the FCRA, its resources are limited and the task is 
overwhelming.432  As advocates of consumer privacy have indicated, 
credit reporting agencies lack sufficient incentive to ensure privacy 
and accuracy because their primary clients are creditors.433  The credit 
grantors themselves also have no incentive to bring an action under 
the FCRA because they can absorb losses associated with it.434 
Only the victims of identity theft have an incentive to enforce the 
FCRA.435  Recognizing that accuracy of credit reports is vital to the 
health of the economy, Congress amended the FCRA to include a 
private right of action for damages as an enforcement mechanism.436  
Compliance with the FCRA, therefore, depends in large part on these 
private actions.437  The Supreme Court’s application of a violation 
occurrence rule, however, eliminates this civil remedy that the FCRA 
was intended to create, leaving the credit reporting agencies with 
little regulation.438 
                                                          
 429. See Brief of Amici Curiae the National Association of Consumer Advocates et 
al. at 18, TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001) (No. 00-1045) (arguing that 
personal data is the business, not the burden of the credit reporting industry). 
 430. See Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 24-25, TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001) 
(No. 00-1045) (advancing the argument that the public interest purposes of the 
FCRA can only be achieved by use of a discovery rule). 
 431. See Brief of Amici Curiae the National Association of Consumer Advocates et 
al. at 19-20, TRW (No. 00-1045) (explaining how the credit reporting agencies are 
virtually unregulated and noting that it would take an army of regulators to review 
the millions of files maintained by the three major credit reporting agencies). 
 432. See Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 28, TRW (No. 00-1045) (explaining that because 
of the enormous volume of consumer reports issued every year, the FTC simply does 
not have the resources to monitor credit reporting agencies effectively). 
 433. Brief of Amici Curiae the National Association of Consumer Advocates et al. 
at 19-20, TRW (No. 00-1045). 
 434. Id. 
 435. Id. 
 436. See id. at 5-6 (explaining that the FCRA was enacted to regulate the credit 
industry because accuracy and privacy of credit reports is vital to a healthy banking 
system). 
 437. See id. at 20 (stating that the FCRA “was designed to be largely self 
enforcing”). 
 438. See id. at 21 (“[I]f petitioner’s position is sustained, the consumer reporting 
industry will be permitted to conduct its business, as it has been, with virtually no 
concern about possible private enforcement of its statutory duties relating to identity 
theft, so long as it can keep the victimized consumer in the dark for up to two 
years.”). 
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CONCLUSION 
Identity theft is becoming an epidemic.  Recently, identity theft 
accounted for more than forty percent of consumer fraud 
complaints.439  The emotional, financial, and physical impact on 
victims is devastating.440  The burdens that the recent Supreme Court 
decision creates and the current inadequacies in the credit reporting 
industry lead consumers to “cry out” for a reform of the legal and 
procedural assistance available for identity theft victims.441  The FTC 
has taken an aggressive approach in meeting its obligations under 
ITADA and assisting victims.442  However, it will not be until 
legislation addresses the “humanity” of the FCRA and creates an 
incentive for the credit industry to shore up its procedures and 
business practices, that victims will be able to fully reclaim their 
identities.443 
 
                                                          
 439. See Identity Theft Topped List of Fraud Complaints Filed By Consumers Last Year, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 24, 2002, at A10 (reporting on the FTC’s findings that the 
average identity theft victim incurs over $1,000 rectifying the damage caused by 
identity thieves). 
 440. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (reporting that identity theft 
violates its victims and leaves lasting emotional, physical, and financial scars). 
 441. See supra notes 140-247 and accompanying text (arguing that a discovery rule 
triggering the statute of limitations and more consistent and responsible credit 
reporting procedures are necessary to ease the burden of a victim of identity theft). 
 442. See supra notes 268-97 and accompanying text (describing the programs 
established by the FTC designed to prevent identity theft and assist the identity theft 
victim). 
 443. See supra notes 389-438 and accompanying text (surveying recent legislative 
proposals designed to better protect victims and make credit reporting agencies 
more accountable). 
